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INTERNATIONAL DIRECTIVES RELATING TO 
SENTENCING 
Johan D. van der Vyver* 
INTRODUCTION 
Punishment in international law must fit the crime, the personal dispensation 
of the criminal, and the interests of the international community. This basic norm 
of criminal justice is reflected in Article 78(1) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC Statute) which provides that “in determining the sentence, 
the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take 
into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the personal 
circumstances of the convicted person.”1 Leaving it up to drafters of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence to afford substance to this basic principle became 
necessary due to the time constraints under which the Conference of Diplomatic 
Plenipotentiaries for an International Criminal Court, which was convened in 
Rome on June 15 through July 17, 1998, had to complete its primary mission, 
and the many controversies that prevailed among delegations that tended to 
prefer their own legal traditions, including constitutional standards of their 
respective countries.2  
This Essay is focused on circumstances to be considered by a criminal court 
for purposes of determining an appropriate sentence following the conviction of 
an accused. It will appear that much confusion prevailed in this regard in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals such as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). One analyst, writing at approximately the turn of 
the century, observed that judgments of these ad hoc tribunals on penal policy 
are “far from being comprehensive” and that “there is no emerging penal regime 
discernible,”3 but concluded, somewhat inconsistently, that jurisprudence of the 
 
 * I.T. Cohen Professor of International law and Human Rights, Emory University School of Law; 
Extraordinary Professor in the Department of Private Law of the University of Pretoria. 
 1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
1002 (1998), art. 78(1) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. See also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No 11. IT-95-14-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 771 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000). 
 2 Jens Peglau, Penalties and the Determination of the Sentence in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 141 (Horst Fisher, Claus Krez & Sascha Rold Lüder eds., 2001). 
 3 Jan Christoph Nemitz, Sentencing in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 605, 624 (Horst Fisher, Claus Krez & Sascha Rold Lüder eds., 
2001). 
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ad hoc tribunals “is gradually developing into an international law of 
sentencing.”4  
It is important to note that what has been held out by the ad hoc Tribunals as 
objectives/ purposes/principles/functions/policies/goals of sentencing5 should, 
in some instances, have no bearing on the kind or severity of punishments 
imposed in any given case (e.g. retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, 
deterrence). It is wrong to say categorically that “[t]he objectives of punishment 
provide . . . guidance in determining sentence.”6 Factors that ought to be 
considered for sentencing purposes may in general be classified, for the sake of 
systematic clarity, into two main categories: (1) those that constitute elements 
of an offence, and (2) those that attend the commission of the offence but are not 
part-and-parcel of the actus reus. One can, of course, classify all factors that 
have a bearing on the severity of a sentence as either aggravating or extenuating 
circumstances. However, the concept of “aggravating and extenuating 
circumstances” will—for purposes of this survey—be confined to those 
sentencing considerations that do not form part of the criminal act as such. Those 
that do constitute elements of the offence are confined in this survey to 
“sentencing factors of the offence.” 
One should namely distinguish between (a) the essence of punishment 
(retribution); (b) the functions of punishment (incapacitation, rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and avoiding impunity); (c) factors inherent in or resulting from a 
particular offence and which may be taken into account in determining an 
appropriate sentence (sentencing factors of the offence); and (d) circumstances 
attending the commission of an offence that have a bearing on an appropriate 
sentence in any given case but are in themselves not constituent elements of the 
criminal act as such (extenuating and aggravating circumstances). 
I. THE ESSENCE OF SENTENCING (RETRIBUTION) 
A sentence imposed by a court of law is essentially a manifestation of 
retribution. In the Čelebići case, the ICTY depicted the theory of retribution as 
“an inheritance of the primitive theory of revenge, which urges the Trial 
 
 4 Id. at 625. 
 5 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarać, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 836, (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (referring interchangeably to sentencing “objectives,” 
“purposes,” “principles,” “functions,” or “policy” that ought to guide judicial officers when deciding on an 
appropriate sentence). 
 6 See Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 33, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003). 
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Chamber to retaliate to appease the victim.”7 The Tribunal added: “A 
consideration of retribution as the only factor in sentencing is likely to be 
counter-productive and disruptive of the entire purpose of the Security Council, 
which is the restoration and maintenance of peace in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. Retributive punishment by itself does not bring justice.”8 
In Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, the ICTY came to the opposite 
conclusion: 
[Retribution] is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge 
but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at 
these crimes . . . A sentence of the International Tribunal should make 
plain the condemnation of the international community of the behavior 
in question and show “that the international community was not ready 
to tolerate serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights.”9 
In Prosecutor v. Todorović, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY gave the following 
assessment of retribution: 
The principle of retribution, if it is to be applied at all in the context of 
sentencing, must be understood as reflecting a fair and balanced 
approach to the exaction of punishment for wrongdoing. This means 
that the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the wrongdoing; in 
other words that the punishment be made to fit the crime. The Chamber 
is of the view that this principle is reflected in the account, which the 
 
 7 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 1231 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). 
 8 Id. .See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R.117, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 7 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 1999); Faiza P. King & Anne-Marie La Rosa, Penalties Under the 
ICC Statute, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 311, 329-30 (Flavia 
Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds.,1999) (referring to exactly this type of occurrence in Rwanda). 
 9 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, ¶ 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Mar. 24, 2000) (citing Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 28 (Sept. 
4, 1998)). See also Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, ¶ 900 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34; Prosecutor v. 
Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Dec. 10, 2003); Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgement, 
¶¶ 143, 150 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-
14/2-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 1075 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. 
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-09-39-A, Appeal Chamber Judgement, ¶ 775, 804 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG-Corr, 
Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 38 (May 23, 2014); Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 11 (Mar. 21, 
2016). 
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Chamber is obliged by the Statute and the Rules to take, of the gravity 
of the crime.10 
Earlier, a Trial Chamber of the same tribunal defined the proportionality 
principle inherent in the concept of retribution more accurately by referring to 
retribution as “‘just deserts’, . . . the punishment having to be proportional to the 
gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.”11 
It is wrong, of course, to say that the purpose of punishment is retribution,12 
because punishment for criminal conduct is (a form of) retribution. In one of its 
more recent judgments, the ICTR stated: “Retribution is the expression of the 
social disapproval attached to a criminal act and to its perpetrator and demands 
punishment for the latter for what he has done.”13 
The ICTY was perfectly correct when it, in the case of Kunarać, defined 
retribution as merely “punishment of an offender for his specific criminal 
conduct.”14 So too was a passage taken from a Canadian case that succinctly 
proclaimed: “Retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate 
punishment and nothing more.”15 In a similar vein, Faiza King and Anne-Marie 
La Rosa identified retribution “in the sense of punishment rather than revenge” 
as a goal of the ICC.16 Just to emphasize it once again, punishment is a particular 
manifestation of retribution; it is therefore wrong to say that retribution is a 
function or the purpose of punishment or worse still, is an element to be taken 
into account for sentencing purposes. When it is said that “retribution may be 
out of fashion with legal scholars,”17 this must be understood in the context only 
 
 10 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-T, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001). See also Prosecutor v. Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34; Prosecutor v. Češić, 
supra note 9, ¶ 23. 
 11 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R.117, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 65 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996) (emphasis added). See also Prosecutor v. Kambanda, supra note 9, 
¶ 58; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement ¶ 243 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 25, 1999) (noting that a sentence depends mainly on the “magnitude of the crime and the extent 
of liability of the accused”); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R.117, Judgment in Sentencing Appeal, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese, ¶ 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000) (noting that, 
in addition to extenuating and aggravating circumstances, sentences are determined by “the degree of iniquity 
of the crime” and “the subjective state of mind of the convicted person”); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, supra note 
9, ¶ 50; Prosecutor v. Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1075; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 804; Prosecutor v. 
Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 11. 
 12 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 24. 
 13 Prossecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgement & Sentence, ¶ 108 (Mar. 14, 2005). 
 14 Prosecutor v. Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 841. See also Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, Case No. IT-97-25-T, 
Judgement ¶ 508 (Mar. 15, 2002). 
 15 Prosecutor v. Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1075 (referring to R v. M, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, ¶ 80 (Canada)). 
 16 King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 330. 
 17 Id. 
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of the fallacious assumption that retribution is a function or purpose of 
punishment, or a circumstance to be considered for sentencing purposes. 
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF PUNISHMENT 
Justifications for punishment include incapacitation of the convicted 
criminal, his or her rehabilitation, and deterrence.18 The European Court of 
Human Rights has identified as “penological grounds” for detention, 
objectives—such as punishment, deterrence, public protection, and 
rehabilitation.19 To this list should be added the objective of obviating impunity. 
The functions of punishment will for purposes of the present survey be classified 
under the headings of (a) incapacitation, (b) rehabilitation, (c) deterrence, and 
(d) obviating impunity. 
A. Incapacitation 
The protection of society is relevant and important when persons guilty of 
serious crimes are regarded as dangerous to the community.20 This would 
particularly be the case where a person who instigated the commission of a crime 
might re-offend.21 Such protection is normally achieved by incarceration of a 
convicted criminal.  
Taking this function of punishment into account when deciding on the length 
of imprisonment requires special circumspection, because “our ability to predict 
which offenders are likely to re-offend is so poor.”22 The crimes within the 
jurisdiction of international tribunals are in many cases ones that would normally 
be committed in very special circumstances, such as an armed conflict or large-
scale political unrest, and when those circumstances no longer prevail‒‒and that 
is mostly the case at the time perpetrators of the concerned offences are brought 
to trial‒‒the need for the community to be protected becomes negligible.23 
 
 18 Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Error of Retributivism, 24 MELBOURNE L. REV. 124, at 
134 (2000). See also King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 329 (mentioning retribution [sic], deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation as “objectives of punishment”). 
 19 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H. R. 317, ¶ 40 (July 9, 2013). See also the British case 
of R. v. Bieber, [2009] 1 WLR 233 (CA), ¶ 40 (listing as “legitimate objects” of imprisonment, “punishment, 
deterrence, rehabilitation and protection of the public”). 
 20 Prosecutor v. Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1232. 
 21 King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 332. 
 22 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 135. 
 23 King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 331. 
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In Kunarać, the Trial Chamber practically ruled out protection of society as 
a legitimate sentencing incentive: 
Unless it can be shown that a particular convicted person has the 
propensity to commit violations of international humanitarian law, or, 
possibly, crimes relevant to such violations, such as “hate” crimes or 
discriminatory crimes, it may not be fair and reasonable to use 
protection of society, or preventive detention, as a general sentencing 
factor.24 
B. Rehabilitation 
It has been said that rehabilitation “should be one of the goals of 
sentencing,”25 and “that punishment must strive to attain . . . rehabilitation.”26 In 
Prosecutor v. Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal took into account for purposes of 
punishment “the rehabilitative potential” of the convicted person, noting that 
such potential goes hand in hand with reintegration of the convicted person into 
society.27 
It is one thing to say that the Accused has shown remorse and has undergone 
a change of heart, which may be a legitimate mitigating factor for purposes of 
sentencing;28 it is quite another to proclaim rehabilitation and reconciliation to 
be determinants of an appropriate punishment. Faiza King and Anne-Marie La 
Rosa have argued that rehabilitation could be a relevant consideration for 
sentencing purposes in cases of “low-ranking soldiers or civilians who simply 
followed orders,” and in the case of young offenders.29 They also slightly missed 
 
 24 Prosecutor v. Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 843. See also Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 508 
(noting that incapacitation of the dangerous is of little significance for sentencing purposes); Prosecutor v. 
Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 776; Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 11; Krajis Stuart Beresford, 
Unshackling the Paper Tiger—The Sentencing Practices of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 1 INT’L CR. L. REV. 33, at 45–46 (2001). 
 25 William A. Schabas, Penalties, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY 1497, 1519 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); and see Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 61; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Second 
Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 16(i) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia March 5, 1998) (appearing under the 
heading “Age”); Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 291 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 12, 26 (May 21, 1999); 
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 849. 
 26 Prosecutor v. Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 53. See also id., at 146 (the Sentencing Tribunal accepting 
“steps taken toward rehabilitation” as a mitigating factor). 
 27 Prosecutor v. Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 27. 
 28 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 68 (June 1, 2000) 
(noting that “there is cause to believe that the accused has undergone a profound change and there are good 
reasons to expect his re-integration into society”). 
 29 King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 332. 
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the point. The fact that a particular perpetrator was a low-ranking member of the 
armed forces following orders or was relatively young at the time the crime was 
committed, is indeed a mitigating circumstance and would be deserving of 
special rehabilitation efforts, but his or her possible rehabilitation as such is not 
a factor to be considered for sentencing purposes. To argue otherwise might even 
be taken to justify longer prison sentences in such cases so as to increase the 
time available for a rehabilitation program to have a better chance of success. 
There are judgments proclaiming rehabilitation to be one of the “principal 
aims” of sentencing,30 or in the case of “younger, or less-educated, members of 
society,” laying stress on “reintegrating the guilty accused into society.”31 In 
Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, the Trial Chamber expressed its support for 
“rehabilitative programmes in which the accused may participate while serving 
his sentence.”32 In the Sentencing Judgment in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Serushago, the ICTR noted, under the heading of mitigating circumstances, that 
the family obligations of the Accused, his relatively young age, and the fact that 
he cooperated with the Prosecutor and publicly showed remorse, “would suggest 
possible rehabilitation.”33 
In the Čelebići Case, on the other hand, the Appeals Chamber decided that 
rehabilitation “cannot play a prominent role in the decision-making process of 
the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal.”34 One analyst noted that in sentencing 
policies of the ad hoc Tribunals rehabilitation is regarded as subordinate to 
 
 30 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 33. 
 31 Prosecutor v. Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1233 (where, for sentencing purposes, the Tribunal considered 
“the age of the accused, his circumstances, his ability to be rehabilitated and availability of facilities in the 
confinement facility”); see also Prosecutor v. Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1079; see generally, Beresford, supra note 
24, at 44. 
 32 Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 291 (laying special stress on the relatively young age of the 
Accused, who was 23 when the crime was committed). See also Prosecutor v. Kupreṧkić, supra note 9, ¶ 849 
(expressing its support for the sentencing purpose of rehabilitation “in the hope that in future, if faced with 
similar circumstances, they [the persons convicted] will uphold the rule of law”); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, 
Second Sentencing Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 16(i) under the heading: “Age”. 
 33 Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S-T, ¶ 39 (Feb. 5, 1999). 
 34 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, ¶ 806 (Feb. 20, 2001). See also Prosecutor v. Blaṧkić, 
supra note 1, ¶ 781–82; Prosecutor v. Kronjelać, supra note 14, ¶ 508; Prosecutor v. Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 35; 
Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 143; Prosecutor v. Kordić, supra note 9, 
¶1079; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, ¶ 402 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 325, 328 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Krajiṧnik, supra note 9, ¶ 806; Prosecutor 
v. Kabashi, Case No. IT-04-84-R77-1, ¶ 11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 16, 2011); 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, supra note 9, ¶ 38; Prosecutor v. Popović , Case No. IT-05-88-A, ¶ 1966 (Jan. 30, 2015); 
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, at ¶ 11. 
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deterrence.35 In its first sentencing judgment in the Case of Erdemović, the ICTY 
altogether ruled out rehabilitation as a sentencing objective.36 
It has been said that rehabilitation and punishment may be inconsistent.37 A 
penitentiary is evidently not an ideal setting for rehabilitation.38 Prison 
conditions, on the contrary, have the propensity to promote recidivism. It is 
furthermore questionable whether rehabilitation efforts are at all called for in 
cases of “Makrokriminalität”; that is “criminality in which the State or some 
similar entity is directly involved.”39 
However, rehabilitation has come to be accepted as an important objective 
of imprisonment. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
indeed provides: “The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners 
the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.”40 
Rehabilitation also features prominently in the United Nations’ Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.41 
At the regional level, the European Prison Rules of the Council of Europe 
similarly provide: “All detentions shall be managed so as to facilitate the 
reintegration into a free society of persons who have been deprived of their 
liberty.”42 The Rules further provide that “the [prison] regime for sentenced 
 
 35 Nemitz, supra note 3, at 614. 
 36 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 11, ¶ 66. See also King & La Rosa, supra 
note 8, at 332. 
 37 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 136. 
 38 See Prosecutor v. Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 844 (noting that to assume that “imprisonment alone . . . 
can have a rehabilitative effect on a convicted person” is “a controversial proposition”). 
 39 Claus Kreß & Guran Sluiter, Preliminary Remarks, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1751, 1755 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 
2002). 
 40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 10(3), Dec. 16,1966 
(Annex), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6314/49, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
See also American Convention on Human Rights, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 5(6), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). 
 41 See United Nation’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, ¶ 56–64, ECOSOC Res. 
663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957, as amended by ECOSOC Res. 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977 (emphasizing (a) 
that the ultimate purpose of imprisonment is “to protect society against crime”, ¶ 58; (b) that steps should be 
taken to ensure the prisoner’s “gradual return to life in society”, ¶ 60(2); (c) that community agencies should be 
enlisted, wherever possible, “to assist the staff of the institution in the task of rehabilitation of the prisoners”, 
¶ 61; that medical services should be provided “to detect and . . . treat any physical or mental illness or defect 
which may hamper a prisoner’s rehabilitation”, ¶ 62; (d) that treatment of each prisoner is to be individualized, 
¶ 59, 63(1); (e) that individualization of treatment should not be hampered by a too large prison population in 
closed institutions, ¶ 63(3); and that rehabilitation efforts do not end upon a prisoner’s release, and that after-
care should be provided by government or private agencies, ¶ 64). 
 42 European Prison Rules, Rule 6, Recommendation REC (2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on Jan. 11, 2006 at the 952d Meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies. 
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persons shall be designed to enable them to lead a responsible and crime-free 
life,”43 and that a sentence plan for each prisoner, and “a strategy for their 
release” be devised,44 which may, as far as practicable, include work, education, 
other activities and preparation for release.45 The European Court of Human 
Rights has noted that “the emphasis in European penal policy is now on the 
rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, particularly toward the end of a long prison 
sentence.”46 For this reason, life sentences without the option of parole have 
come to be unacceptable, “since all prisoners, including those serving life 
sentences, be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of release 
if that rehabilitation is achieved.47 The Court noted that “if a prisoner is 
incarcerated without any prospect of release and without the possibility of 
having his life sentence reviewed, there is the risk that he can never atone for his 
offence: whatever the prisoner does in prison, however exceptional his progress 
towards rehabilitation, his punishment remains fixed and unreviewable.”48 
Provision must therefore be made for the reducibility of a life sentence “which 
allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the life 
prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been 
made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no 
longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.”49  
The Court cited Article 110(3) of the ICC Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence pertinent to that Article that make provision for the periodic 
review of a life sentence after the convicted person has served twenty-five years 
of the sentence, which in the opinion of the Court serve as a commendable 
directive of contemporary international criminal law.50  
The above goes to show that once a person has been sentenced to 
imprisonment, provision should be made for, and he or she should be given the 
benefit of, rehabilitation programs. It does not imply that rehabilitation should 
 
 43 Id., Rule 102.1. 
 44 See id., Rule 103.2. 
 45 Id., Rule 103.4. 
 46 Vinter v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, ¶ 115. See also Dickson v. The United Kingdom (GC) Appl. 
No. 44362/04, 2007-V ECHR, ¶ 75 (Dec. 4, 1997); Boulois v. Luxemburg (GC), Appl. No. 37575/04, Eur. Ct. 
H. R., ¶ 83 (Apr. 3, 2012). Special emphasis was placed on re-integration into society of a prisoner as an objective 
of incarceration in Mastromatteo v. Italy (GC) Appl. No. 37703/97, 2002-VIII ECHR, ¶ 72 (Oct. 24, 2002); 
Schemkamper v. France, Appl. No. 75833/01, ¶ 31 (Oct. 18, 2005); Majorano v. Italy, Appl. No 28634/06, ¶ 108 
(Dec. 15, 2009). 
 47 Vinter v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, ¶ 114. See also id., ¶ 116. 
 48 Id., ¶ 112. 
 49 Id., ¶ 119. 
 50 Id., ¶ 65 and 114. 
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serve as a factor to be taken into account when deciding on an appropriate 
sentence. 
This means that once a person has been sentenced to imprisonment, 
provision should be made for, and he or she should be given the benefits of, 
rehabilitation programs. It does not imply that rehabilitation should serve as a 
factor to be considered when deciding on an appropriate sentence. 
C. Deterrence and General Rehabilitation 
According to Faiza King and Anne-Marie La Rosa, deterrence of future 
crimes “is obviously a primary goal of the ICC.”51 It has been decided that 
deterrence “is a consideration that may legitimately be considered in 
sentencing.”52 Deterrence has also been singled out in some judgments of the ad 
hoc tribunals as “probably the most important [sentencing] factor.”53 In 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY did observe that 
deterrence “must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment 
of the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the International 
Tribunal.”54 In Prosecutor v. Todorović, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY 
recognized “the importance of deterrence as a general consideration in 
sentencing,” but then somewhat obscurely promised that it “will not treat 
deterrence as a distinct factor in determining sentence in this case.”55 As noted 
in Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, punishment as such, rather than the severity of a 
sentence, is in reality “the tool of retribution, stigmatization and deterrence.”56  
In Prosecutor v. Delalić, the Tribunal included in the concept of deterrence, 
(a) deterring the accused, and (b) deterring other persons finding themselves in 
similar situations in the future,57 referred to in Prosecutor v. Kunarać as, 
 
 51 King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 330.  
 52 Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 48; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 803; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 24. 
 53 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1234; Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 64-66; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 28; 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-S, Sentence, ¶ 19 (Oct. 2, 1998); Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 288; 
Serushago, supra note 25, ¶ 20; Kayishema, supra note 25, Sentence ¶ 2; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 761; Ruggiu, 
supra note 28, ¶ 33; Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 900; Dragan Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 134; Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, 
Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 754, 760, 765 (Jan. 24, 2004); Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 144; 
Beresford, supra note 24, at 42. 
 54 Tadić , supra note 11, ¶ 48; Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 185; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 801; Prosecutor 
v. Dario Kordić & Mario Čerlkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, ¶ 847 (Feb. 26, 2001); Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34; 
Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 26; Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 805. 
 55 Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 30. 
 56 Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 290. 
 57 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1234; Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 288. 
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respectively, “specific deterrence” and “general deterrence”,58 and in later 
judgments as “personal”, “individual” or “special” deterrence, and “general” 
deterrence, respectfully.59 This vital distinction is not always evident in 
judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals.60 Emphasis is almost exclusively on general 
deterrence.61 It has thus been said in a judgment of the ICTR: “This Chamber 
seeks to dissuade for good those who will attempt in future to perpetuate such 
atrocities by showing them that the international community was not ready to 
tolerate the serious violations on international humanitarian law and human 
rights.”62 
The ICTY on several occasions expressed the opinion, in the spirit of general 
deterrence, that “[o]ne of the main purposes of a sentence imposed by an 
international tribunal is to influence the legal awareness of the accused, the 
surviving victims, their relatives, the witnesses and the general public in order 
to reassure them that the legal system is implemented and enforced,” and 
additionally, “to convey the message that globally accepted laws and rules have 
to be obeyed by everyone.”63 In Prosecutor v. Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal 
observed that general deterrence “serves to strengthen the legal order . . . and to 
reassure society of the effectiveness of its general provisions.”64 In Prosecutor 
v. Kabashi, the Sentencing Tribunal warned that “persons who believe 
themselves to be beyond the reach of the International Tribunal must be warned 
that they have to abide by its orders or face prosecution and, if convicted, 
sanctions.”65 Affirmative prevention through legal sanctions in times of war 
 
 58 Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 839; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1203; Bagaric, supra note 18, at 137; Češić, 
supra note 9, ¶ 25 (referring to “special deterrence” and “general deterrence”); Katanga, supra note 9, at para 
38; Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 11. 
 59 Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 134-35; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 145-46; Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1076-78; 
Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 805; Kabashi, supra note 34, ¶11. 
 60 Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 839. 
 61 See Prosecutor v. Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 456 
(Dec. 6, 1999) (noting that punishment is directed at retribution “and over and above that” at deterrence); 
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 28; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 20 (Feb. 5, 1999); Todorović , supra note 10, ¶ 30; 
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 28 (Feb. 27, 2003); Stakić, supra 
note 9, ¶ 899; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 124; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 25; Kordić, 
supra note 9, ¶ 1080–82; Kabashi, supra note 34, ¶11. See also Daniel B. Richard, Proposed Sentencing 
Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, at 125 (1997); Beresford, 
supra note 24, at 42. 
 62 Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 28; Kayishema, supra note 25, ¶ 2; Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra 
note 10, ¶ 30. 
 63 Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 139; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 149. 
 64 Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 26. 
 65 Kabashi, supra note 34, ¶ 11; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 848; Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1078, 1080-82; 
Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 807. 
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“have to demonstrate the fallacy of the old Roman principle of inter arma silent 
leges (amid the arms of war the laws are silent.66 
In Prosecutor v. Stakić, the Trial Chamber stated, quite confusingly, that 
“general deterrence is more accurately described as deterrence aiming at 
reintegrating potential perpetrators into the global society.”67 Re-integration of 
a convicted felon into society has to do with rehabilitation and not with 
deterrence; and furthermore, to maintain that persons other than the criminal are 
in need of being reintegrated into society is a rather stupid thing to say. 
In Kunarać, the Trial Chamber, quite realistically, concluded that “special 
deterrence, as a sentencing factor, is generally of little significance before this 
jurisdiction,” simply because “the likelihood of persons convicted here ever 
again being faced with an opportunity to commit war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide or grave breaches is so remote as to render its consideration 
in this way unreasonable and unfair.”68 
General deterrence ought not to be considered as a sentencing factor for 
reasons of principle rather than practicality, since punishment should address the 
culpable conduct of the accused only, and it would be unfair to impose a harsh 
sentence on the convicted person in the expectation that it might deter others.69 
D. Obviating Impunity 
Thwarting impunity,70 and reprobation by the community or stigmatization 
of the convicted criminal,71 were mentioned in a sentencing context in judgments 
of the ICTY and the ICTR. In Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, the Trial Chamber said: 
“It is the mandate and the duty of the International Tribunal, in contributing to 
reconciliation, to deter such crimes and to combat impunity.”72 One analyst 
 
 66 Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1078. 
 67 Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 902; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 137; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 147 (referring also 
to Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 185); Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 806. 
 68 Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 840; see also Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 508; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 52 
(noting that deterrence should not be afforded “undue prominence”); Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 145; Beresford, 
supra note 24, at 45; Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 137 (noting that specific deterrence does not 
work in cases of severe punishments such as imprisonment). 
 69 Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 840; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 26. 
 70 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 65; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 26; Akayesusupra note 53; Furundžiya, 
supra note 25, ¶ 288; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 455. 
 71 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 64, 65, 66; see also Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 289; Blaškić, supra 
note 1, ¶ 763. 
 72 Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 288; see also Kamuhanda, supra note 53, ¶ 754; Mark A. Drumbl, 
Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to ‘Civis’ in Rwanda, 75 N.Y. UNIV. L. REV. 1221, at 1277 
(2000). 
VAN DER VYVERPROOFS_6.5.19 6/5/2019 10:52 AM 
2019] INTERNATIONAL DIRECTIVES 547 
expressed the view that stigmatization of the perpetrator in itself “is often 
sufficient redress.73 Although these appendices of punishment are important 
considerations for criminalizing certain atrocious acts and creating tribunals for 
their prosecution, they have no place, really, in sentencing guidelines. 
Putting institutions and procedures in place to bring perpetrators of such 
atrocities to answer for their conduct will inevitably result in absence of 
impunity, condemnation of the act and the actor by right-thinking members of 
the world community and disgracing the convicted perpetrators for what they 
have done. Those consequences also serve as justification for having an 
international criminal justice system in place, but should not, perhaps even could 
not, have a bearing on an appropriate sentence in any given case. Because of 
these considerations, the criminal act must be punished, but the kind and gravity 
of the punishment to be imposed are conditioned by considerations other than 
the inevitable function and effects of punishment per se. 
Blameworthiness of perpetrators of criminal conduct, in a word, legitimizes 
obviating impunity, reprobation, and stigmatization; but preventing impunity, 
reprobation, and stigmatization does not determine the subjective 
blameworthiness of the perpetrator. 
III. SENTENCING FACTORS 
A retributive response to crime must, for purposes of punishment, account 
for several factors inherent in, or attending, the criminal conduct. At the Rome 
Conference, the Working Group on Penalties listed those factors, somewhat 
unsystematically and as a guide for Drafters of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, as including:  
[T]he impact of the crime on the victims and their families; the extent 
of damage caused or the danger posed by the convicted person’s 
conduct; the degree of participation of the convicted person in the 
commission of the crime; the circumstances falling short of exclusion 
of criminal responsibility such as substantially diminished mental 
capacity or, as appropriate, duress; the age of the convicted person; the 
social and economic condition of the convicted person; the motive for 
the commission of the crime; the subsequent conduct of the person 
who committed the crime; superior orders; the use of minors in the 
commission of the crime.74  
 
 73 William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L.J. 461, 502 (1997). 
 74 Rep. of the Working Group on Penalties, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGP/L.14/Corr.2 (1998). 
VAN DER VYVERPROOFS_6.5.19 6/5/2019 10:52 AM 
548 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
These guidelines were intended to fit the general directive enunciated in the 
Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals75 and which did go into the Statute of the ICC, 
reducing the sentencing factors to ones “such . . . as the gravity of the crime and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person,”76 thereby upholding the 
principle of proportionality (punishment must be proportional to the gravity of 
the crime) and the principle of individualization (punishment must be based on 
personal circumstances of the convicted person).77 It has accordingly been 
decided that a trial tribunal must observe “the over-riding obligation to 
individualize a penalty to fit the individual circumstances of the accused and the 
gravity of the crime.”78 As succinctly stated in Prosecutor v. Obrenović: “An 
accused shall be held liable for his actions and omissions—no more and no 
less.”79 
A. Gravity of the Offence 
In the Čelebići Case, the Trial Chamber said: “By far the most important 
consideration, which may be regarded as the litmus test for the appropriate 
sentence, is the gravity of the offence.”80 
 
 75 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 24(2), contained in the 
annex of the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda, art. 23(2), contained in the annex of S.C. Res. 955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; see Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 53; Schabas, supra note 25, 1523–24. 
 76 Rep. of the Working Group on Penalties, art. 77(1), supra note 74; see ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 
78(1). 
 77 See King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 332–37; Peglau, supra note 2, at 147; see also Erdemović, supra 
note 11, ¶ 41 (speaking of “[t]he principle of proportionality and of appropriateness of sentence to the 
individual”); Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 61; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 771; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 115; Bemba 
Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 11; 
 78 Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 717; see also Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 58; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 22; 
Aleksovski, supra note 11, ¶ 242; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 852; Čerkez, supra note 54, ¶ 847; Todorović, 
supra note 10, ¶ 110; Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 507; Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-55-T, 
Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 1097 (Dec. 3, 2003); Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 54, 62; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case 
No. IT-94-2-A, ¶ 9 (Feb. 4, 2005); Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, ¶ 291 (May 
23, 2005); Stakić, supra note 34, ¶ 375; Prosecutor v. Naletilić, Case No. IT-98-34-A, ¶ 593 (May 3, 2006); 
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, ¶ 2263 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 
2008); Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 817 (July 14, 2009); 
Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 673 (Mar. 31, 2011). 
 79 Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 78.  
 80 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1225; see also id., ¶ 1260 (calling gravity of an offence the “touchstone of 
sentencing”); Erdemović, supra note 25, ¶ 15; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 27; Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. 
IT-95-10-T, Judgement, ¶ 121 (Dec. 14, 1999); Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 182; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 852; 
Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 47–49; Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 249 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000); Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 847, 731; Kunarać, supra note 
5, ¶ 841; Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 847; Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgement, ¶ 101 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5, 2001); Todorović , supra note 10, ¶ 29, 31; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, 
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The gravity of the crime “is normally the starting point for consideration of 
an appropriate sentence,”81 and has been singled out as “[t]he cardinal feature in 
sentencing.”82 
Retribution requires a certain proportionality between the gravity of a crime 
and the punishment imposed for that crime.83 Gravity of the crime was said to 
depend on the circumstances of the case as well as the form and degree of 
participation in the crime by the Accused.84 The element of gravity is more 
broadly determined by (i) the nature of the crime, (ii) the manner in which it was 
executed, (iii) the motive of the perpetrator, and (iv) the consequences of the 
criminal act.85 It should be noted that the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
pertaining to the determination of sentence make no mention of the nature of the 
crime as such. This does not mean that the ICC will not for sentencing purposes 
consider the inherent gravity of a particular crime. The Rules do refer to “the 
extent of damage caused” and “the nature of the unlawful behavior and the 
means employed to execute the crime” as factors to be considered by the Court 
in its determination of sentence,86 and those factors, among others, do have an 
impact on the nature and gravity of an offence. The sentencing factors listed in 
the Rules are furthermore expressly stated as applying only inter alia, and 
aggravating circumstances may include others not listed in the Rules “which, 
although not enumerated . . . , by virtue of their nature are similar to those 
mentioned.”87 
 
Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 698 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Duško Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-S, ¶ 106 (Nov. 13, 
2001); Prosecutor v. Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 61, ¶ 23; 25, 52; Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, 
Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 101-02 (Dec. 2, 2003); Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 144; Prosecutor 
v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, ¶ 156 (Feb. 25, 2004); Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 31; Deronjić, supra note 9F, 
¶ 154; Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 267 (Apr. 19, 2004); Stakić, supra note 34, ¶ 375; Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, ¶ 36 (July 10, 2012); Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 15.  
 81 Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 182; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 36. 
 82 Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 25; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 36. 
 83 Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 126 (referring to “the fundamental principle of proportionality”); King & La 
Rosa, supra note 8, at 333; Beresford, supra note 24, at 41, 46; see also Richard, supra note 61, at 125 (insofar 
as he identifies the proportionality requirement with the lex talionis, Richard has it slightly wrong). 
 84 Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 852; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 731; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 26; Češić, supra 
note 9, ¶ 32. 
 85 See King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 334 (mentioning, with reference to jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
Tribunals, the hierarchy of crimes, the number of victims killed, the relative scale and magnitude of the crime, 
and other factors, such as the existence of an armed conflict); Nemitz, supra note 3, at 614 (noting, with a 
different emphasis, that the ranking of crimes is determined by the nature of the crime and the consequences of 
the act).  
 86 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalized Draft Text of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 145(1)(c), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/Inf/3/Add.1 (July 12, 2000) 
[hereinafter “RPE”]. 
 87 Id.; Rule 145(2)(b)(vi). 
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1. The Nature of the Crime 
The nature of the crime has a particular bearing on its relative gravity for 
sentencing purposes. The special gravity of the offences within the jurisdiction 
of the ad hoc Tribunals has been emphasized in many of the Tribunals’ 
judgments.88 The ICTR has thus proclaimed that all crimes within its jurisdiction 
are serious violations of international humanitarian law.89 
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, a Trial Chamber of the ICTR referred to 
“the principle of gradation in sentencing, which enables the Tribunal to 
distinguish between crimes which are of the most heinous nature, and those 
which, although reprehensible and deserving severe penalty, should not receive 
the highest penalties.”90 Earlier, in Prosecutor v. Kambanda, the ICTR held that 
“[t]he degree and magnitude of the crime is still an essential criterion for 
evaluation of sentence.”91 The Tribunal laid special stress on the gravity of 
crimes against humanity, noting that those crimes “are . . . conceived as offences 
of the gravest kind against the life and liberty of the human being.”92 In 
Prosecutor v. Serushago, the ICTR emphasized the “extreme gravity” of 
genocide as “the crime of crimes.”93 Genocide and crimes against humanity have 
been held to be inherently aggravating crimes.94 In Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, 
the Trial Chamber stated that “[t]orture is one of the most serious offences 
known to international criminal law and any sentence imposed must take this 
into account.”95 In the same case, the Appeals Chamber decided that “crimes 
which result in the loss of human life should be punished more severely.”96 In 
Prosecutor v. Todorović, the Tribunal observed in the same context that 
 
 88 See Erdemović, supra note 25, ¶ 15; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1225; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 468; 
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 782-86; Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 182; Furundžiya, supra note 80, ¶ 249; Delalić, 
supra note 34, ¶ 731; Jelisić, supra note 80, ¶ 101; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 144. 
 89  Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 367 (June 1, 2001); 
Bagosora, supra note 78, ¶ 2263; Renzaho, supra note 78, ¶ 817; Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 673. 
 90 Prosecutor v. Elizaphan & Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T, ¶ 884 (Feb. 21, 
2003). 
 91 Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 57. 
 92 Id., ¶ 43. 
 93 Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 15, 27; Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Appeal 
Chamber Judgement, ¶ 53 (July 9, 2004). See infra, the text accompanying foonotes 95–98. See also Prosecutor 
v. Omar Al Bashir (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmed Al Bashir), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 133 (Mar. 4, 2009). 
 94 Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 33; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 48. 
 95 Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 281. 
 96 Furundžiya, supra note 80, ¶ 244; see also Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R.117, 
¶ 29 (July 14, 1997); Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 787; Nemitz, supra note 3, at 622-23. 
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persecution “is a particularly serious crime,”97 and that this also applies to “the 
murder and the sexual assaults perpetrated by the accused.”98 
The question as to the existence of a hierarchy of crimes based on their 
inherent gravity has provoked profound disagreement in the jurisprudence of the 
ad hoc Tribunals and in scholarly comments on that jurisprudence. There are, to 
be sure, those who maintain that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc 
Tribunals “are presented on an equal footing,” and that “it does not seem 
possible to classify these international crimes in a hierarchical way.“99 
The inherent gravity of some crimes over others cannot be denied.100 The 
ICC Statute in fact contains several indications of a hierarchy of certain 
crimes.101 It thus affords to States Parties the right to temporarily exclude the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC for war crimes committed in their territory or 
by their nationals, but not others;102 the crime of genocide and crimes against 
humanity are without exception to be regarded as “manifestly unlawful” and 
liability for those crimes can therefore never be excused on the basis of superior 
orders;103 defense of property can only exclude criminal responsibility for a war 
crime and can therefore not be raised as a defense against charges of genocide 
and crimes against humanity.104 
The ongoing debate in this regard is mainly focused on the relative gravity 
of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Trial Chamber, in its sentencing 
judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadić, based the extreme gravity of crimes against 
 
 97 Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 57. 
 98 Id. ¶ 66. 
 99 Emanuela Fronza, Genocide in the Rome Statute, in 1 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 105, 117–18 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999). Fronza 
refers to a passage in Prosecutor v. Akayesu where it was held that “there is no justification in the [ICTR] Statute 
for finding that crimes against humanity or violations of common article 3 and additional protocol II are in all 
circumstances alternative charges to genocide and thus lesser included offences.” Id. at 118 n.43; Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 470 (Sept. 2, 1998). Note, however, that Akayesu was not 
concerned with the inherent gravity of crimes for sentencing purposes here but with the problem of bringing 
cumulative charges. Id. See also Kayishema, supra note 89, ¶ 367; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 13; Stakić, supra 
note 34, ¶ 375.  
 100 King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322–23; see, e.g. Kai Ambos, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International 
Criminal Law, in 4 SENTENCING AND SANCTIONING IN SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 17, 33–34 (Roelof 
Haveman & Olaoluwa Olusanya eds., 2006). 
 101 Schabas, supra note 25, at 1506. 
 102 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 124. 
 103 Id. art. 33(2); see Andreas Zimmermann, Superior Orders, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 957, 972 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. 
Jones eds., 2002). 
 104 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 31(1)(c). 
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humanity on the fact that they, per definition, are committed on a widespread 
scale or systematically: 
A prohibited act committed as part of a crime against humanity, that is 
with an awareness that the act formed part of a widespread or 
systematic attack on a civilian population, is, all else being equal, a 
more serious offence than an ordinary war crime. This follows from 
the requirement that crimes against humanity be committed on a 
widespread or systematic scale, the quantity of the crime having a 
qualitative impact on the nature of the offence which is seen as a crime 
against more than just the victims themselves but against humanity as 
a whole.105 
This approach finds support in the reasoning of the International Law 
Commission (ILC). In a comment on the war crimes provisions in its 1996 Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the ILC proclaimed 
that crimes against the peace and security of mankind “are the most serious on 
the scale of international offences” exactly because “the crimes in question must 
have been committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale.”106 
There seems to be general agreement that genocide constitutes “the crime of 
crimes” and is therefore the most serious of offences within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals.107 In Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 
the ICTR thus noted that genocide is “inherently aggravating,”108 and this fact is 
 
 105 Tadić, supra note 96, ¶ 73; see also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Joint Separate 
Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶¶ 21, 25 (Oct. 7, 1997). 
 106 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 54 (1996) 
(emphasis added); see also Micaela Frulli, Are Crimes Against Humanity More Serious than War Crimes?, 12 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 329, 335 (2001). 
 107 Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 16; see also id. ¶ 42; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 27; Rutaganda, supra note 
61, ¶ 451; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 986 (Jan. 27, 2000); 
Jelisić (A), supra note 80, ¶ 13(Wald, J., partially dissenting); Krstić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 699; WILLIAM A. 
SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–11 (2000) (proclaiming that in a hierarchy founded on the 
seriousness of crimes, “genocide belongs at the apex of the pyramid”); King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322; 
Schabas, Genocide, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 107, 109 (Otto Triffterer 
ed., 1999); William A. Schabas, The Crime of Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 447, 463 (Horst Fischer, Claus Kress & Sascha Rolf 
Lüder eds., 2001); Nemitz, supra note 3, at 620; LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 141 (2002); Antonio 
Cassese, Genocide, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 335, 
344–45 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); Christine Byron, The Crime of 
Genocide, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 143, 144 
(Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe & Eric Donnelly eds., 2004). 
 108 Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 42; see also Akayesu, supra note 99, ¶ 469; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 15. 
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germane to sentencing.109 However, it has also been said that it is “more 
difficult” to rank the inherent gravity of genocide against that of crimes against 
humanity.110 
There is an influential body of opinion holding that the gravity of crimes 
against humanity exceeds that of war crimes.111 It has been noted that crimes 
against humanity and war crimes based on the same conduct protect different 
interests.112 In Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judge Cassese in a separate opinion 
maintained that although there is in abstracto no hierarchy of gravity applying 
a priori to different crimes,113 such a hierarchy does emerge when the very same 
act is classified as a war crime and a crime against humanity.114 Murder as a 
crime against humanity would, for example, warrant a higher sentence than 
murder as a war crime, because as a crime against humanity, willful killing 
“possesses an objectively greater magnitude and reveals in the perpetrator a 
subjective frame of mind which may imperil fundamental values of the 
international community to a greater extent” than would be the case if the 
offense was prosecuted as a war crime.115  
The assumption that crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 
a systematic manner or on a large scale deserve higher sentences than “ordinary” 
war crimes has become a matter of profound controversy within the ICTY.116 In 
its judgment in the sentencing appeal in Prosecutor v. Tadić, the Appeals 
Chamber found that “there is in law no distinction between the seriousness of a 
crime against humanity and that of a war crime,” basing its opinion exclusively 
on the ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.117 Jan Nemitz 
 
 109 Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 14–15. 
 110 See, e.g., Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 14; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 14.  
 111 Tadić, supra note 11, ¶¶ 1, 16 (separate opinion of Judge Cassese); Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 14; see 
also id., ¶ 43 (noting that crimes against humanity “are . . . offences of the gravest kind against the life and 
liberty of the human being”); Erdemović, supra note 105, ¶¶ 20–25; Furundžiya, supra note 80, ¶ 8 (declaration 
of Vorah, J.); King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322, 333-34; Frulli, supra note 106, at 335; id., at 349 (concluding 
that crimes against humanity are more serious than war crimes); Ambos, supra note 100, at 33–34. 
 112 Flavia Lattanzi, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes in the Jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 473, 497 (Horst Fischer, Claus Kress & 
Sascha Rolf Lüder eds., 2001). 
 113 Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 7. 
 114 Id. ¶ 10. 
 115 Id. ¶ 15; see also Ambos, supra note 100, at 34. 
 116 See generally, Lattanzi, supra note 112, at 498–503; Nemitz, supra note 3, at 618–20.  
 117 Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 69 (majority opinion); see also Tadić, supra note 11 (separate opinion of 
Shahabuddeen, J.); Tadić, supra note 8, at 3 (separate opinion of Robinson, J.); Erdemović, supra note 105, 
¶¶ 19–23, 26; Erdemović, supra note 25, at 2 (separate opinion of Shahabuddeen, J.); Blaškić, supra note 1, 
¶ 804; Furundžiya, supra note 80, ¶¶ 241–42, 247; Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 511; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 32. 
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maintained that war crimes can, in given circumstances, be as serious, or even 
more serious, that crimes against humanity, mentioning the example of the 
intentional killing of prisoners of war as part of a widespread practice and 
involving state authorities.118 In Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the Trial Chamber noted 
that the ICTY has not yet established a hierarchy of gravity of the crimes within 
its jurisdiction and therefore decided to “confine itself to assessing [for 
sentencing purposes] seriousness based on the circumstances of the case.”119  
It stands to reason that, within the realm of war crimes, grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Protocol I to those Conventions 
should not per se be treated as more serious than the ones not stipulated as grave 
breaches, and that the gravity of a war crime should also not be assessed in view 
of the distinction between international armed conflicts and armed conflicts not 
of an international character.120 
A factor taken into account as an element of crime A can be considered as 
an aggravating factor for crime B, of which it is not an element.121 Humiliation 
as an element of the crime of humiliating and degrading treatment can therefore 
be considered as an aggravating circumstance following a concurrent conviction 
of rape, of which it is not a constituent element.122 In Prosecutor v. Češić, the 
Sentencing Tribunal declined to consider exacerbated humiliation twice, namely 
as an element of a war crime and of the corresponding crime against humanity, 
and decided in all fairness to impose a single sentence for which it considered 
the degree of humiliation only once in its final determination of an appropriate 
sentence.123 
2. The Manner in Which the Crime Was Executed 
Gravity of a crime can also emerge from the manner in which the offence 
was executed.124 The ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence refer to “the nature 
of the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the crime” as a 
sentencing factor that applies in general,125 and to “[c]ommission of the crime 
 
 118 Nemitz, supra note 3, at 618. 
 119 Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶¶ 800–03. 
 120 Schabas, supra note 25, at 1507. 
 121 Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 172; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 53. 
 122 Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 53. 
 123 Id. ¶ 54. 
 124 See Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 186.  
 125 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c). 
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with particular cruelty” that has to be considered as an aggravating 
circumstance.126 
The heinous means used for the killing of victims of the crime was specially 
mentioned as an aggravating sentencing factor in Prosecutor v. Kayishema.127 
In Prosecutor v. Jelesić, the ICTY held out “the repugnant, bestial and sadistic 
nature” of the accused’s conduct and the “cold-blooded commission of murders 
and mistreatment of people” as contingencies that warrant severe punishment.128 
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, the ICTR stated that at the “upper end of the 
sentencing scale” are “those who commit[ ]crimes with especial zeal or 
sadism.”129 In Prosecutor v. Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal referred to the 
“exacerbat[ing] humiliation and degradation, depravity and sadistic behaviour” 
of the accused as aggravating factors.130 
In the Tadić sentencing judgment, the Trial Chamber took into 
consideration, as an aggravating circumstance, the convicted person’s 
“awareness of, and enthusiastic support for” the atrocities upon which his 
conviction was based.131 In the Čelibići case, the Trial Chamber found the “most 
disturbing, serious and thus, [] aggravating aspect” of the criminal acts was that 
the accused “apparently enjoyed using this [electric shock] device upon his 
helpless victims,”132 and referred to the manner in which the crimes were 
committed as “indicative of a sadistic individual who, at times, displayed a total 
disregard for the sanctity of human life and dignity.”133 
3. The Motive of the Perpetrator 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence also list, as an aggravating 
circumstance, “any motive involving discrimination” on grounds such as “. . . 
 
 126 Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(iv). 
 127 Kayishema, supra note 25, at ¶ 18. 
 128 Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 86. 
 129 Ntakirutimana, supra note 90, ¶ 884; see also Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 69; 
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1264, 1268, 1274–1275; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 783; Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 874; 
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 486 (May 16, 2003); Nahimana, 
supra note 78, ¶ 1097; Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 680. 
 130 Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 53; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1262 (referring to “not only the inherent 
suffering involved in rape, but exacerbat[ing] her [the victim’s] humiliation and degradation by raping her in the 
presence of his [the convicted person’s] colleagues.”). 
 131 Tadić, supra note 96, ¶ 57; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1227. 
 132 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1264; see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 193. 
 133 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1268; see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 193. 
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age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.”134 
A discriminatory motive has also been endorsed as an aggravating 
circumstance in the ad hoc Tribunals.135 In Prosecutor v. Tadić, ethnic and 
religious discrimination and nationalistic sentiments were mentioned by 
name.136 In Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, the Trial and the Appeals Chambers laid 
special stress on verbal abuse as an aggravating factor.137  
In the Čelebići case, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY was quite correct in 
saying: “Motive is not an essential ingredient of liability for the commission of 
an offence. It is to some extent a necessary factor in the determination of 
sentence after guilt has been established.”138 
If the perpetrator committed the offence with “cold, calculated 
premeditation, suggestive of revenge against the individual victim or group to 
which the victim belongs,” this should be taken into account as an aggravating 
circumstance, but if he or she committed the offence “reluctantly and under the 
influence of group pressure and, in addition, demonstrated compassion toward 
the victim or the group to which the victim belongs,” this must be taken into 
account in mitigation of sentence.139 Tolerance and lack of bigotry will also 
count in mitigation of a sentence.140 In Erdemović, the accused actually saved a 
victim’s life, and this counted to his credit in sentencing.141 
4. Harmful Consequences of the Criminal Act 
Cruelty of the criminal act is closely related to the harmful consequences of 
an offense, which has also been singled out as an element that falls under the 
nature of the crime as a sentencing directive.142 The link appears from a 
statement in the sentencing judgment of Duško Tadić, where the ICTY referred 
 
 134 Compare RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(b)(v), with ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3). 
 135 Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 172; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1269; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 784. 
 136 Tadić, supra note 96, ¶ 55; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 867. 
 137 Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ¶ 276 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002); Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 161. 
 138 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1235; see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 250, 
272 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).  
 139 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1235; see also Krstić, supra note 80, ¶ 711. 
 140 Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgement), supra note 25, ¶ 16(i) (under Character). 
 141 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 105, 107. 
 142 King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322; see also Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 70; Erdemović, supra note 11, 
¶ 20; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1225, 1260, 1273; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Sentence, 
¶ 16 (May 21, 1999). 
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in one breath to the cruelty of the act and the humiliation suffered by the victim 
as aggravating sentencing factors.143 The ICC’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence speak of “the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm 
caused to victims and their families,”144 and also, as an aggravating 
circumstance, of “[c]ommission of the crime where the victim is particularly 
defenceless.”145 It furthermore singles out “[c]ommission of the crime . . . where 
there were multiple victims” as a matter of aggravation.146 
The number of victims killed would clearly come within the confines of the 
above directives.147 But it goes beyond that. In the Čelebići Case, the Trial 
Chamber called gravity of an offense the “touchstone of sentencing,” and noted 
that gravity includes the impact of the crime on victims.148 It made special 
mention of the “substantial pain, suffering and injury” inflicted by the 
perpetrator upon each of his victims, and the “permanent physical and 
psychological scars” that resulted from the cruelty to which they were 
exposed.149 In Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, the Trial Chamber mentioned as 
sentencing guidelines, alongside “the nature of the act or omission” and “the 
context in which it occurred, the personal circumstances of the victim including 
age, sex and health, as well as the physical, mental and moral effects of the act 
upon the victim,” and the fact that the criminal act had long-term effects.150 
In the sentencing policy articulated in the case of Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, 
the Trial Chamber laid special stress on “the severe physical pain and great 
emotional trauma that Witness A has had to suffer as a consequence of these 
depraved acts committed against her.”151 The Tribunal had noted that the victim 
“was a civilian detainee and at the complete mercy of her captors.”152 In 
 
 143 Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 22; see also Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, ¶¶ 63–65 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001).  
 144 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c). 
 145 Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(iii). 
 146 Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(iv). 
 147 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 15; Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 866; Krstić, supra note 80, ¶ 701; Češić, 
supra note 9, ¶ 32; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 337–38 (May 20, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 440 (Dec. 13, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Serugendo, Case No. ICTR-2005-84-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 90 (June 12, 2006); Ndindabahizi v. 
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, Judgment, ¶ 135 (Jan. 16, 2007); Prosecutor v. Rugambarara, Case No. 
ICTR-00-59-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 24 (Nov. 16, 2007); Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, 
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 579 (Dec. 7, 2007); Prosecutor v. Bagosora & others, supra note 78, ¶ 2272; Gatete, 
supra note 78, ¶ 679.  
 148 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1260; see also Krstić, supra note 80, ¶ 701; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 32. 
 149 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1273; see also Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 56.  
 150 Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶ 235; see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 200–05.  
 151 Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 287.  
 152 Id., ¶ 283. 
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Prosecutor v. Banović, the Sentencing Trial Chamber made special mention of 
the fact that the prison victims “were particularly vulnerable, frightened and 
isolated individuals,” and accepted “the position of inferiority and the 
vulnerability of the victims” as “relevant factors in assessing the gravity of the 
offence.”153 
In Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the Trial Chamber also emphasized, as an 
aggravating circumstance, “the physical or emotional scars borne by the victims, 
their suffering at the loss of loved ones and the fact that most of them are still 
unable to return to their homes to this day.”154 The Tribunal was particularly 
sensitive to the fact that victims were members of the civilian population and 
included women and children.155 In Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, the victims 
included women, children, the elderly, and persons in captivity, and their 
vulnerability and position of helplessness were taken into account as aggravating 
factors.156 In Prosecutor v. Kunarać, special significance was attached for 
sentencing purposes to the fact that several of the sexual assault victims were 
young.157 Several judgments emphasized, as an aggravating circumstance, the 
fact that victims at the time of the trial still suffered from the trauma brought 
upon them by the perpetrators’ criminal conduct.158 It has further been noted by 
one analyst that “the gravity of a crime is not only affected by the actual harm, 
but also by the danger caused to other legal values, i.e. the potential harm that 
may result from the offense.”159  
It has been held that for sentencing purposes, victims are not to be confined 
to those directly affected by the crime but may also include their next-of-kin.160 
This proposition has subsequently been challenged. In Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, 
the ICTY noted that effects of an offence on relatives—or friends—of the 
immediate victims have no bearing on the criminal culpability of the convicted 
person and, therefore, “it would be unfair to consider such effects in determining 
a sentence.”161 The ICTY subsequently changed its mind by holding that the 
 
 153 Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 50; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, at ¶ 352; Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. 
IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002); Obrenović, 
supra note 9, ¶¶ 102–03; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 184.  
 154 Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 787.  
 155 Id. ¶ 786; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 867; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 213(iv).  
 156 Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 137.  
 157 Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶¶ 835, 864, 879. 
 158 Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶ 276; Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶¶ 164–66; Krnojelać, supra note 14, 
¶ 144. 
 159 Nemitz, supra note 3, 617. 
 160 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1226.  
 161 Krnojelać, supra note 14, at ¶ 512; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 852. 
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impact of an offense on the relatives and friends of the victims may be taken into 
account for sentencing purposes,162 for example in the case of murder and sexual 
assault.163 
It should finally be noted that compassion shown, and assistance rendered 
by an accused to certain victims can also serve as a mitigating factor.164 The 
ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence expressly mention “efforts by the 
person to compensate the victims” as a mitigating circumstance.165 
5. Participation of the Accused in the Criminal Conduct 
The ICC’S Rules of Procedure and Evidence refer to “the degree of 
participation of the convicted person” in the offense of which he or she was 
convicted, and to “the degree of intent” as factors to be considered for sentencing 
purposes.166 
There are thus many sides to the personal conduct and dispensation of the 
convicted person that should weigh with international tribunals in assessing an 
appropriate sentence on basis of the principles of retributive justice. Some of the 
personal factors that are to be considered relevant for achieving proportionality 
between the crime and the sentence derive from the participation of the 
convicted person in the crime and are objective in nature, while others may be 
defined as subjective attributes of the convicted person. Those subjective factors 
will be considered hereafter under the heading of Retributive Justice. 
The objective standards attending conduct of the accused again fall into two 
main categories: (1) personal responsibilities of the person, and (2) the form of 
perpetration for which he or she was held responsible.  
Several judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals stressed the status of the person 
within the community as an aggravating circumstance.167 It has been decided, 
for example, that “[a]buse of positions of authority or trust is generally 
considered an aggravating factor,”168 and even that a command position deserves 
 
 162 Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 260 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003); see also Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 38.  
 163 Češić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 39, 44. 
 164 See infra Section D.2(c). 
 165 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(a)(ii). 
 166 Id. Rule 145(1)(c). 
 167 See generally Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 28–29; Kayishema, supra note 142, ¶ 15; Kordić, supra 
note 54, ¶ 847; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 90; Nemitz, supra note 3, 612. 
 168 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 44 (Sept. 4, 1998); see also Kayishema, supra note 142, ¶ 26; 
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1220; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, 
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a higher sentence than direct participation in the crime.169 Particularly critical in 
this regard is the position occupied by an accused in the organizational hierarchy 
of the prevailing power structures.170 As stated in the Čelebići Case: “It would 
constitute a travesty of justice, and an abuse of the concept of command 
authority, to allow the calculated dereliction of an essential duty to operate as a 
factor in mitigation of criminal responsibility.”171 
In Prosecutor v. Kambanda, the fact that the accused was Prime Minister of 
Rwanda was accordingly taken into consideration as an aggravating factor.172 In 
the Čelibići Case, the ICTY made something of the fact that it was dealing with 
high-ranking political officials and military officers,173 and also took a grim view 
of the fact that one of the accused was deputy commander of the prison camp 
where the atrocities were committed.174 In Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, special 
mention was made, as an aggravating circumstance, of the accused having held 
a high-ranking position in the civil service.175 In Prosecutor v. Todorović, the 
superior position of the accused as Chief of Police was considered an 
aggravating factor.176 In Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletelić & Vinco Martinović, 
the Trial Chamber noted that the accused was “something of a legend in the 
region” and that his “command role . . . is [therefore] an aggravating factor.”177 
Mrs. Biljana Plavšić was at the time the crime was committed President of the 
Republic of Srpska and her “high leadership position” led the Court to decide 
that “misplaced leniency would not be fitting and that a substantial sentence of 
imprisonment is called for.”178 The Sentencing Tribunal did, on the other hand, 
decide that the fact that “witnesses . . . of high international reputation”––
including United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, President of 
Sweden Carl Bildt, and Head of the Mission of the Organization for Society and 
Co-operation in Europe Robert Frowick––came forward to testify on her behalf, 
 
¶¶ 1003–04 (Jan. 27, 2000); Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶¶ 172, 210.  
 169 Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 791; see also id. at ¶ 768. 
 170 See, e.g., Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 60; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶¶ 50, 451, 469; Blaškić, supra note 1, 
¶ 788; Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 847; Todorović, supra note 143, ¶ 60–62; Krstić , supra note 80, ¶ 708; Sikirica, 
supra note 80, ¶ 140; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 60; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 99; Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 678. 
 171 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1250; see also Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 187.  
 172 Kambanda, supra note 168, ¶ 61.  
 173 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1234. 
 174 Id., ¶ 1268; see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 193–94, 213 (iii).  
 175 Kamuhanda, supra note 53, ¶ 764. 
 176 Todorović, supra note 143, ¶¶ 59, 66.  
 177 Prosecutor v. Naletelić, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 751 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003). 
 178 Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 60; see also Renzaho, supra note 78, ¶ 824 (the Sentencing Tribunal affording 
only “very limited weight” to the convicted person’s lengthy public service and assistance rendered by him to 
the Tutsi victim group). 
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and her post-conflict role in ensuring that the Dayton Accord was accepted and 
implemented in the Republic of Srpska,179 added “much weight to the plea in 
mitigation put forward in this regard.”180 She was seventy-two years old at the 
time and was sentenced to eleven years imprisonment for her “participation in a 
crime of utmost gravity” (persecution).181  
Of special significance in regard to war crimes is the position of the Accused 
in the chain of command.182 In Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, the Appeals Chamber 
decided that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber was “manifestly 
inadequate” because, amongst other things, the sentencing Tribunal failed to 
treat the position of the convicted person as a commander as an aggravating 
circumstance.183 In Prosecutor v. Tadić, on the other hand, the Appeals Chamber 
decided that a sentence in excess of twenty years imprisonment on any counts 
in the indictment would be excessive because the level in the command structure 
of the accused was low.184 In the Čelebići Case, the ICTY regarded the fact that 
a commanding officer only had constructive knowledge of the criminal act (he 
did not know but should have known) as a potential mitigating factor.185 
It should be emphasized, though, that a position of authority should not, in 
and of itself, attract a harsher sentence; it is the abuse or wrongful exercise of a 
position of authority that serves as an aggravating factor.186 The principle of 
“graduation of sentence”––that is, the rule that “the most senior levels of the 
command structure should attract the severest sentences, with less severe 
sentences for those lower down the structure”187––is therefore “not absolute.”188 
 
 179 Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 85–94. 
 180 Id., ¶ 94. 
 181 Id., ¶¶ 132, 134. 
 182 See, e.g., Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 862; Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 184; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 847; 
Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 863; Musema, supra note 168, ¶¶ 381, 382. 
 183 Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 187. 
 184 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals, ¶¶ 55–57 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000); see also Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 847.  
 185 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1250; see also Schabas, supra note 25, at 1522 (noting that command 
responsibility is based on negligence). 
 186 Krstić, supra note 80, ¶ 709; Kayishema, supra note 89, ¶ 358; Prosecutor v. Elizaphan, Case No. 
ICTR-96-10-A & ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 563 (Dec. 13, 2004); Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72-A, 
¶ 80 (July 18, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-A, Judgment, ¶ 347 (Sept. 19, 2005); 
Stakić, supra note 34, at ¶ 411; Ndindabahizi, supra note 147, ¶ 136; Simba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-
01-76-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 284–85 (Nov. 27, 2007); Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, 
¶ 230 (Mar. 12, 2008); Hadžihasanović, supra note 34, ¶ 320; Renzaho, supra note 78, at ¶ 823; Gatete, supra 
note 78, ¶ 678. 
 187 Musema, supra note 168, ¶ 382. 
 188 Hadžihasanović, supra note 34, ¶ 321.  
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Also at the objective level, emphasis is placed on the form and degree of 
participation in the crime.189 Playing a leading role in the execution of atrocities 
clearly serves as an aggravating circumstance,190 while those not playing a 
significant role in the commission of an offense should receive lighter 
sentences.191 The Trial Court is required to reflect on the sentence imposed, “the 
predominant standard of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and 
the degree of responsibility of the offender.”192  
A distinction can therefore be made for sentencing purposes between 
principal perpetrators and accessories, on the understanding that the latter group 
is entitled to lighter sentences.193 Inchoate participation, such as an attempt to 
commit the crime, is generally treated for sentencing purposes as being of a less 
serious nature.194 Merely aiding and abetting has generally been considered as 
warranting a reduced level of criminal responsibility.195 In Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, the Trial Chamber gave the accused credit for the fact that his “direct 
participation in the commission of the acts of violence was relatively limited.”196 
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, the ICTR stated that those who planned or 
ordered the atrocities deserved the highest penalties.197 
It should be noted, though, that in some instances not playing an active role 
in the execution of a crime is inherent in the criminal conduct (the crime of which 
the accused was found guilty) and should therefore not be taken into account as 
a mitigating circumstance. In Prosecutor v. Vincent Rutaganira, for example, 
the accused pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, complicity by an omission 
in the crime of extermination (not intervening to stop massive killings and 
injuring of Tutsi who had taken refuge in a church building in a district where 
the accused was an elected Counselor). In considering an appropriate sentence, 
 
 189 Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 852; Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 182; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 731; Jelisić, 
supra note 80, ¶ 101; Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 903; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 50; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 144; 
Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 154, 156. 
 190 Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 19; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 470; Radoslav Brdanin, Case No. IT-00-
36-A, ¶ 413 (Apr. 3, 2007); Bagosora, supra note 78, ¶ 2272; Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 680. 
 191 See Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 236; Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 509; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156. 
 192 Akayesu, supra note 53, Sentence, ¶ 40, cited with approval by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, ¶ 414 (June 1, 2001); see also Dragan Nikolić, supra note 34, 
¶ 144; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 154. 
 193 See, e.g., Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 49; see also id., ¶¶ 77–79 (noting that the accused did not personally 
commit any of the acts of violence); Ambos, supra note 100, at 33. 
 194 Schabas, supra note 25, at 1507. 
 195 Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 182; Krstić , supra note 80, ¶¶ 251, 266, 268; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case 
No. ICTR-98-44A-T, ¶ 963 (Dec. 1, 2003) (noting that an “indirect form of participation” such as incitement to 
commit genocide and aiding and abetting warrants a lesser sentence). 
 196 Aleksovski, supra note 11, ¶ 236; see also Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156. 
 197 Ntakirutimana, supra note 90, ¶ 884. 
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the Chamber noted that not participating in the actual killings “goes to his 
criminal conduct rather than to mitigation.”198 
Closely related is the supposition that persons acting upon the orders of a 
superior official should receive a lighter sentence. The Statutes of the ad hoc 
Tribunals expressly state that acting “pursuant to an order of a Government or 
of a superior shall not relieve . . . [the accused person] of criminal responsibility, 
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if . . . justice so requires.”199 
The principle has been applied in several judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals.200  
In terms of the ICC Statute, superior orders will, to the contrary, in certain 
limited circumstances exclude criminal liability, namely if the perpetrator was 
under a legal obligation to obey the order, did not know that the order was 
unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful.201 Nothing is provided in 
the ICC Statute as to the mitigating effect on sentencing of superior orders that 
fall short of these requirements. Although some analysts maintain that superior 
orders will be treated as a mitigating circumstance by the ICC,202 it is equally 
reasonable to assume that acting upon a superior order which the perpetrator was 
not obliged to obey, or which he or she did not know was unlawful, or which 
was as a matter of fact manifestly unlawful, should not serve as a mitigating 
circumstance. 
Although the ICTY in Furundžiya subscribed to the principle that those not 
acting as principal perpetrators deserve lighter sentences,203 the Tribunal did 
judge the accused, being an aider and abettor,204 harshly for his “active role as a 
commander of the Jokers,”205 the Jokers being a special unit of the military 
police responsible for the atrocities in issue in that case. In the Čelebići Case, 
the Appeals Chamber decided that in certain circumstances the gravity of the 
crime might be so great that a very severe penalty is to be imposed in spite of 
 
 198 Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶¶ 137–38. 
 199 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, art. 6(4), annex of the Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 
(1993); STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, art. 5(4), annex of S.C. Res. 955 (1994), 
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994). 
 200 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 15, 20, 53; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1281 (declining to take 
superior orders into account as a mitigating factor because the accused executed the orders without reluctance 
and in fact took some pleasure in the infliction of pain and suffering on the victims). 
 201 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 33. 
 202 See, e.g., King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 335.  
 203 Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 281. 
 204 Id., ¶ 282. 
 205 Id., ¶ 283. 
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the fact that the accused did not occupy a senior position in the overall command 
structure.206 
In the second sentencing judgment in the case of Erdemović, the ICTY 
accepted duress as an extenuating circumstance, describing the accused as “the 
helpless victim” with “no choice in taking part in the Srebrenica operations,” but 
also at times risking his life by breaking out of “this chain of helplessness” and 
actually refusing to kill some members of the target group.207 In Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY observed that duress can only be 
considered as an extenuating circumstance if the convicted person “had no 
choice or moral freedom in committing the crime.”208 It should be noted that 
duress deriving from superior orders can in exceptional circumstances be so 
severe as to leave the subordinate without any freedom of choice, in which event 
it would not only serve as an extenuating circumstance but become a ground of 
justification that would warrant a finding of not guilty. 
The judgment of the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blaškić also makes 
instructive reading in the present context: 
The fact that the accused did not directly participate may be taken as a 
mitigating circumstance when the accused held a junior position 
within the civilian or military command structure. However, the Trial 
Chamber considers that the fact that commanders . . . played no direct 
part cannot act in mitigation of the sentence when found guilty.209 
Theories of retribution are mostly founded on the premise that “offenders 
deserve to suffer and that the institution of punishment should reflect the 
suffering they deserve.”210 Retributive theories assert that “punishment must be 
equivalent to the level of wrongdoing.”211 
In undiluted form, retribution may be likened to retaliation, or punishment 
in kind. Based on the teachings of the celebrated mathematician, Pythagoras 
(circa 540–504 B.C.), the lex talionis accordingly required an arithmetical 
 
 206 Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 847; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 858; Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 301; 
Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 45; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 32. 
 207 Erdemović, supra note 25, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 17; see also Erdemović, supra note 11, Sentencing 
Judgment, ¶¶ 16-20, 54, 89; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1283; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 161. 
 208 Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 769; see Omar Serushago v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, ¶ 27 (Apr. 
6, 2001) (The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR not accepting duress as an extenuating circumstance because it was 
neither alleged nor proven at trial.). 
 209 Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 768; see also Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶¶ 301-05 (deciding that the fact that 
the accused was a low-level offender did not alter the seriousness of his crime). 
 210 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 127. 
 211 See id. at 157. 
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equilibrium between the wrongful act and retributive punishment in accordance 
with the classical adage: “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.”212 This 
approach was characteristic of “primitive” societies, where the kind and 
measurements of punishment were exclusively based on the nature and gravity 
of the criminal act.213 As noted by one analyst, “no one regards raping a rapist, 
or torturing a torturer, as appropriate punishment today.”214 The idea of 
retribution being a matter of retaliation, or at least remnants of that idea, 
regrettably, still lingers on in many contemporary systems of criminal law, and 
in the minds of many people. When an outraged community calls for justice, 
they mostly seek revenge. 
But retribution is not revenge.215 The harm suffered which triggered acts of 
revenge are not necessarily wrongful acts in the legal sense; revenge is not 
necessarily commensurate with the harm caused by the act being revenged; a 
revenge-inspired act does not set a precedent for similar responses to the same 
kind of harmful acts; the victims of revenge are not necessarily confined to the 
person whose conduct sparked the retaliatory response, but could for example 
include a spouse, child or relative of that person; the person taking revenge often 
derives pleasure from suffering of the other; and revenge is personal in the sense 
that the avenger is typically the person wronged.216  
To be “just deserts,” retribution‒‒as we have seen‒‒must be “proportional 
to the gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.”217 The “just 
desert” theory “places the requirement of justice, rather than the pursuit of crime 
prevention, at the foundation of the general justification for criminal 
sanctions.”218 That is to say, judicial response to a criminal act must be 
conditioned by the demands of retributive justice, which, among other things, 
make criminal liability dependent on the subjective culpability or 
blameworthiness of the accused.219 Retributive justice requires (a) making a 
 
 212 See Leviticus 24:19-20: “If a man injures his neighbor, what he has done must be done to him: broken 
limb for broken limb, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. As the injury inflicted, so must be the injury suffered.” 
 213 F.J. van Zyl & J.D. van der Vyver, Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap, 228–29. Durban: Butterworths 
(1982). 
 214 Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at 
the International Criminal Court, 44 COL. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 840 (2006). 
 215 Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 185; see also Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 847; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34; 
Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 150; King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 330. 
 216 See Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 163–64. 
 217 Supra, the text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 218 Beresford, supra note 24, at 40. 
 219 See Kabashi, supra note 34, ¶ 11 (noting that a sentence must “properly reflect[] the personal 
culpability of the wrongdoer”); Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 12; Frulli, supra note 106, at 336 (noting that 
the mental element influences the gravity of a crime); Nemitz, supra note 3, at 616 (noting that gravity of a crime 
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conviction for criminal conduct dependent on fault in the form of dolus (intent) 
or culpa (negligence) on the part of the perpetrator; and (b) taking into account, 
for sentencing purposes, reduced culpability of the offender.220 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence accordingly instruct the ICC to take 
into account for purposes of sentencing “the degree of intent” of the person 
concerned.221 Committing the crime “knowingly and with premeditation” 
therefore deserves to be severely punished.222 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence mention in their list of mitigating 
circumstances those “falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion of 
criminal responsibility, such as substantially diminished mental capacity or 
duress.”223 Requiring that diminished mental capacity must be “substantial” is 
perhaps unfortunate, since every manifestation of reduced culpability, provided 
it is real, should serve as a consideration for the reduction of sentence. Grounds 
for reduced culpability include subjective attributes of the perpetrator which do 
not altogether exclude his or her capacity to form a criminal intent or negligent 
disposition but nevertheless diminished his or her ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of the criminal act or to act in accordance with that insight. 
It should in the present context be emphasized that personal attributes of the 
accused do not in all instances have an impact on mens rea but could still serve 
as extenuating or aggravating factors for sentencing purposes. In Prosecutor v. 
Furundžiya, for example, the Tribunal was not concerned with the question of 
reduced culpability when considered the young age of the accused (23 years at 
the time the offence was committed) to be a mitigating circumstance.224 Mental 
capacity per se was also not the issue when the Trial Chamber, in Prosecutor v. 
Goran Jelesić, decided that “Judges cannot accord too great a weight” to 
personal attributes of the convicted person, such as age (he was twenty-two years 
old when the crime was committed), no previous convictions for any violent 
crime, and being the father of a young child,225 and, perhaps more puzzling, that 
the fact the he suffered from “personality disorders, [and] had borderline 
 
derives from (a) the actus reus (harmfulness of the offence), and (b) mens rea (culpability of the offender)); 
Peglau, supra note 2, at 143 (noting that “the sentence must not exceed the culpability of the criminal”). 
 220 Peglau, supra note 2, at 143, 147. 
 221 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c); see also King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 332 (including under 
the rubric of gravity of the offence, the “types of intent”). 
 222 See Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 61. 
 223 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(a)(i). 
 224 Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 283; see also Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 39 (where the convicted person 
was thirty-seven years old at the time the crime was committed). 
 225 Jelisić, supra note 80, ¶ 124. 
VAN DER VYVERPROOFS_6.5.19 6/5/2019 10:52 AM 
2019] INTERNATIONAL DIRECTIVES 567 
narcissistic and anti-social characteristics” did not diminish his criminal 
responsibility.226 
In Prosecutor v. Todorović, conflicting reports of psychiatrist as to the 
alleged post-traumatic stress disorder of the accused were presented to the Trial 
Chamber. This is a matter of mens rea. The Tribunal proceeded on the 
assumption that the onus rested on the accused to prove on a balance of 
probabilities his or her grounds of diminished culpability,227 and consequently 
declined to take the mental condition of the accused into account as a ground in 
mitigation of sentence.228 It must be emphasized, with acclamation, that the ICC 
cannot possible follow this same approach. In terms of the ICC Statute, an 
accused has the right “[n]ot to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the 
burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.”229 If the accused should raise any of 
the grounds of diminished culpability, the onus to disprove the same rests 
squarely on the Prosecutor and the Trial Chamber must be satisfied, above 
reasonable doubt, that the grounds relied on by the accused did not exist at the 
time the crime was committed. 
IV. EXTENUATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
When one considers the gravity of a crime and conduct of the perpetrator as 
components of the concept of retribution, their impact on sentencing already 
emerges. It is perhaps wrong to think of the impact of the nature of the crime 
and the means of perpetration of the person concerned on sentencing in terms of 
extenuating or aggravating circumstances. Here the nature and magnitude of a 
particular sentence derives from considerations inherent in the crime as such as 
conditioned by culpability of the Accused on the basis of retributive justice. 
The same is true in regard to the general functions of punishment, which in 
a very limited sense might influence a sentencing judge to decide on a particular 
kind and measure of punishment to be imposed. Extenuating and aggravating 
circumstances embrace additional factors attending the commission of a crime, 
not part of the criminal act per se, which ought to influence the decision to 
impose a lighter or a heavier sentence, as the case might be.230 That, perhaps, is 
what the ICTY had in mind when it proclaimed that “[m]itigation of punishment 
 
 226 Id., ¶ 125. 
 227 Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 93; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1172. 
 228 Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 95. 
 229 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(1)(c)(i). 
 230 See Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 920 (noting that “mitigating circumstances may also include those not 
related to the offence”); see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 145; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 155. 
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in no way reduces the gravity of the crime or the guilty verdict against a 
convicted person.”231 
Since the same factor can warrant a lighter or a heavier sentence, it is perhaps 
inappropriate to put a particular factor in the one, and the other in another 
basket.232 Proposals to this effect were not accepted by the Preparatory 
Commission of the ICC responsible for the drafting of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence.  
In Prosecutor v. Erdemović, the Trial Chamber distinguished between 
mitigating circumstances that existed at the time the crime was committed and 
those that emerged after the crime was committed.233 This distinction is of value 
for purposes of classification only. The suggestion that it might have been 
intended to separate the ones that have an influence on the gravity of the offence 
from those that do not,234 is not tenable. Some of the extenuating and aggravating 
circumstances that existed at the time the crime was committed are quite 
unrelated to the severity of the crime. 
There is an important aspect of the Todorović judgment which merits special 
attention and should be emphasized before particular extenuating and 
aggravating circumstances can be scrutinized in greater detail. In cases where a 
factor that might be considered as an aggravating circumstance constitutes an 
element of the crime, it should not be treated separately as an aggravating 
circumstance.235 It therefore makes no sense to proclaim as a supposed 
aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes that the convicted person 
 
 231 Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 80; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶¶ 37, 56; see also Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 224. 
 232 See Peglau, supra note 2, at 146. 
 233 Erdemović, supra note, ¶ 86. 
 234 See Nemitz, supra note 3, at 608. 
 235 Todorović, supra note 143, ¶ 57; see also Prosecutor v. Kunarać, IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶ 852 (Feb. 
22, 2001); Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 517 ; Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶ 277; Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 904; 
Prosecutor v. Banović, IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 53 (Oct. 28, 2003); Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 144; 
Prosecutor v. Obrenović, IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 99 (Dec. 10, 2003); Vasiljević, supra note 80, 
¶ 17–72; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 53; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 693 (July 29, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, IT-02-61-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, ¶¶ 106, 127 (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor 
v. Momir Nikolić, IT-02-60/1-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 44 (Mar. 8, 2006); Ndindabahizi, supra 
note 147, ¶ 137 (Jan. 16, 2007); Prosecutor v. Renzaho, ICTR-97-31-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 822 (July 14, 
2009); Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 677; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 35 (Mar. 14, 2012); 
Prosecutor v. Dordević, IT-05-87/1-A, Judgment, ¶936 (Feb. 23, 2011); Nzabonimana v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-
98-44D-A, Judgment, ¶ 464 (Sept. 29, 2014); Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 3356, 
3385 (June 24, 2011).  
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“knowingly and consciously,”236 or “voluntarily,”237 participated in the 
commission of the crime, since intentional and voluntary perpetration are 
already included in the concept of fault as an element of criminal liability.238 
In the case of persecution, for example, a discriminatory intent is a basic 
element of the crime and should therefore not be given additional weight for 
purposes of sentencing; and the same applies to the fact that the crime was 
committed against members of the civilian population.239 A discriminatory 
intent can be considered an aggravating factor of crimes against humanity other 
than persecution,240 for example in the case of murder as a crime against 
humanity.241 It has therefore also been decided that premeditation should not be 
taken into account for purposes of sentencing upon a conviction for crimes 
against humanity.242  
It is on the other hand quite feasible and appropriate to take willing 
participation in the crime,243 or premeditation,244 into account as an aggravating 
circumstance. Premeditation is the opposite of spontaneity. If a person commits 
a crime after having considered the consequences of his or her act, he or she is 
clearly more blameworthy than someone who acts on the spur of the moment. 
It simply remains to state, by way of introduction, that the weight to be 
afforded to aggravating and extenuating circumstances is within the discretion 
of the Sentencing Tribunal.245 The burden of proof of aggravating circumstances 
 
 236 Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 50; see also Prosecutor v. Serushago, ICTR 98-39-S, Sentence, ¶ 30 (Feb. 
5, 1999). 
 237 Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 89, ¶ 26; see also Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 
¶ 721 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Aug. 2, 2001) (referring to “conscious and 
voluntary participation”). 
 238 See Schabas, supra note 25, at 1525. 
 239 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Todorović, supra note 143, ¶ 57. 
 240 Prosecutor v. Kunarać, IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶ 357 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, IT-98-
32-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 171, 278. (Nov. 29, 2002). 
 241 Vasiljević, supra note 235, at ¶¶ 173.  
 242 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 793 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 
Mar. 3, 2000). 
 243 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, (Mar. 5, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-
95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 55–57 (July 31, 2001). 
 244 Schabas, supra note 25, at 1525; see Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment, ¶ 61 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. For Rwanda Sept. 4, 1998); Prosecutor v. Delalić, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 1261 (Int’l Trib. For the 
Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Nov. 16, 1998); Serushago, supra note 236, at ¶ 30; Blaškić, supra note 242, at 
¶ 793; Krstić, supra note 237, at ¶ 711. 
 245 Delalić, supra note 244, ¶¶ 777, 780; Momir Nikolić, supra note 235, ¶ 125; Dragan Nikolić, supra 
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is on the Prosecutor, while the burden of proof in respect of mitigating 
circumstances is on the Defense.246 It is also important to note that the ad hoc 
tribunals require that aggravating circumstances be proven beyond reasonable 
doubt,247 while mitigating circumstances require no more than proof on a 
balance of probabilities.248 In Prosecutor v. Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal could 
not conclude on a balance of probabilities that the accused was of a good 
character,249 and therefore did not give him the credit due to a convicted person 
of good character. The Sentencing Tribunal seemingly based its decision on the 
typical Anglo-American legal arrangement which places the burden of proof in 
respect of mitigating circumstances on the accused.250 One might well wonder 
how the burden of proof with regard to mitigating circumstances will play itself 
 
note 235, ¶¶ 125, 141, 145; Deronjić, supra note 235, ¶ 155; Stakić, supra note 235, ¶ 416; Prosecutor v. 
Hadžihasanović & Kubura, IT-01-47-A, Judgment, ¶ 325 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Apr. 
22, 2008); Bizimungu v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-00-56B-A, Judgment, ¶ 400 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda June 
30, 2014); Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 644 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991 Apr. 8, 2015); Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶19. 
 246 Kunarać, supra note 235, ¶ 847; Stakić, supra note 235, ¶ 406. 
 247 Delalić, supra note 244, ¶ 763; Kunarać, supra note 235, ¶ 847; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, IT-95-8-S, 
Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 110 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Nov. 13, 2001); Momir Nikolić, 
supra note 235, ¶ 126; Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, IT-02-60/1-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 145 
(Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Mar. 8, 2006); Češić, supra note 235, ¶ 47; Deronjić, supra 
note 235, ¶ 155; Blaškić, supra note 242, ¶¶ 686, 697; Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, 
¶ 294 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda May 23, 2005); Prosecutor v. Babić, IT-03-72-A, Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Trib. 
For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 July 18, 2005); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, 
¶ 1038 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007); Prosecutor v. Renzaho, ICTR-97-31-T, Sentencing 
Judgment, ¶ 822 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda July 14, 2009); Gatete, supra note 235, ¶ 677; Lubanga, supra 
note 235, ¶ 33. 
 248 Delalić, supra note 244, ¶ 590; Kunarać, supra note 235, ¶ 847; Sikirica, supra note 247, ¶ 110; 
Prosecutor v. Simić, IT-95-9-A, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 40 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Nov. 
28, 2006); Stakić, supra note 235, at ¶ 920; Momir Nikolić, supra note 235, ¶ 126; Dragan Nikolić, supra note 
247, ¶ 145; Deronjić, supra note 235; Blaškić, supra note 242, ¶ 697; Kajelijeli, supra note 247, ¶ 294; Babić, 
supra note 247, at ¶ 43; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, IT-95-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 8 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 Apr. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Dragan Zelenović, IT-96-23/2-A, Sentencing Judgment, 
¶ 11 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Oct. 31, 2007); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, ICTR-
99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1038 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda Dec. 3, 2003); Hadžihasanović & Kubura, supra note 
245, ¶ 302; Gatete, supra note 235, ¶ 677; Lubanga, supra note 235, ¶ 33. 
 249 Češić, supra note 235, ¶ 87. 
 250 See Kajelijeli, supra note 247, ¶ 294 (noting that the burden of proof with the regard to mitigating 
circumstances is on the accused). 
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out in jurisprudence of the ICC, given the express provision in the ICC Statute 
that a person standing trial in the ICC will under no circumstances “have 
imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of 
rebuttal.”251 It is submitted that this provision applies only to material elements 
of a crime, and since mitigating factors are not elements of the crime as such, 
the ICC will most likely follow the approach of the ad hoc Tribunals and require 
an accused to prove mitigating factors relied upon on a balance of probabilities. 
It is also worth noting that the weight to be attached to mitigating 
circumstances is discretionary;252 and that absence on mitigating circumstances 
can never serve as an aggravating circumstance.253  
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence mention the following circumstances 
that must be taken into account for purposes of punishment and which in essence 
fall under the present heading as defined for purposes of this survey:  
In general, the age, education, social and economic conditions of the 
convicted person;254 
As an aggravating circumstance, prior convictions for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC or of a similar nature;255 and 
As a mitigating circumstance, the convicted person’s conduct after the act, 
including his or her efforts to compensate victims and any cooperation with the 
Court.256 
A. Circumstances Existing at the Time the Offence was Committed 
The following extenuating or aggravating circumstances may be singled out 
as ones that existed at the time the offence was committed.  
1. Individual Circumstances of the Accused 
According to Faiza King & Anne-Marie La Rosa, personal circumstances 
should mainly be confined to factors that enable the perpetrator to commit the 
particular crime, such as his or her position in the military or civilian 
 
 251 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(1)(i).  
 252 Prosecutor v. Naletilic, IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 742 (Mar. 31, 2003); Stakić, supra note 235, ¶ 405.  
 253 Blaškić, supra note 242, ¶ 687; Prosecutor v. Plavšić, IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 64 
(Feb. 27, 2003). 
 254 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c). 
 255 Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(i). 
 256 Id. Rule 145(2)(a)(ii). 
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hierarchy.257 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence go well beyond these 
confines and explicitly mention the age, education, and social and economic 
conditions of the convicted person, which, it would seem, can serve as either 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.258  
One is not concerned with personal attributes of the Accused that may be 
indicative of reduced culpability. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, quite 
rightly, deal separately with “the degree of intent”259 and “diminished mental 
capacity”,260 which constitute, within the meaning of this survey, sentencing 
factors of the offence.  
Individual (subjective) circumstances of the accused—such as age, 
background, education, intelligence, and mental structure—received special 
prominence in the sentencing directives of the ICTR in the case of Kambanda.261 
In Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, the young age of the accused (twenty-three years 
at the time the offence was committed) was taken into account as a mitigating 
circumstance.262 In Prosecutor v. Serushago, the ICTR accepted as a mitigating 
factor the fact that the convicted person was the father of six children, two of 
whom were still very young.263 In Prosecutor v. Vinvent Rutaganira, the Trial 
Chamber held the old age of the accused (sixty years) and the state of his health 
(he suffered from diabetes and was in poor health) are factors to be taken into 
account by the Chamber in determining the sentence.264 In Prosecutor v. Biljana 
Plavšić, the fact that until the time of the offence the accused was known to have 
 
 257 King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322–23, 332. 
 258 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c). 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. Rule 145(2)(a)(i). 
 261 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment, ¶¶ 28–29 (Sept. 4, 1998); see also Prosecutor v. 
Krstić (A), IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 267 (Aug. 2, 2001).  
 262 Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 284, 291 (Dec. 10, 1998); see also Erdemović, 
supra note 243, ¶ 16(i) (where the convicted person was twenty-three years old at the time the crime was 
committed); Delalić, supra note 244, at ¶ 1283 (where the convicted person was nineteen years old at the time 
the crime was committed); Serushago, supra note 236, ¶ 39 (where the convicted person was thirty-seven years 
old at the time the crime was committed); Prosecutor v. Serugendo, ICTR-2005-84-I, Judgment, ¶ 91 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For Rwanda June 12, 2006). 
 263 Serushago, supra note 236, ¶ 39; see also Erdemović, supra note 243 (referring to the convicted 
person’s “current family status”); Furundžiya, supra note 262, ¶ 280 (noting, though, ¶ 284, that this factor must 
not be given “significant weight”); Banović, supra note 235, ¶ 82 (taking into account that the accused is married 
and has a child); Obrenović, supra note 235, ¶ 139 (noting that the accused was married to an economist and is 
the father of a six-year old boy); Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 120–21 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For Rwanda Mar. 14, 2005) (noting that being the father of nine children and having a wife who has become 
deputy mayor in charge of women’s development in her commune, “augurs well for the potential rehabilitation 
of the Accused into a local community and his joining the national reconciliation process”). 
 264 Rutaganira, supra note 263, at ¶¶ 132–36. 
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“led an honest, honourable and private family, professional and social life was 
taken into account in mitigation of sentence.”265 
In Prosecutor v. Goran Jelesić, the Tribunal decided that “Judges cannot 
accord too great a weight” to personal attributes of the convicted person, such 
as age (he was twenty-three years old when the crime was committed), no 
previous convictions for any violent crime, and being the father of a young 
child.266 On appeal, focusing only on the element of age, the Appeals Chamber 
recognized that age is an element that should be considered for sentencing 
purposes,267 but since all that is required was for the Trial Chamber to consider 
the age of the accused, which it did,268 the appeal on this ground was dismissed. 
Emphasis in jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR on age as a mitigating 
factor has been criticized by one analyst, denouncing for example the verdict in 
Furundžiya, referred to above,269 as “a strange decision, as clearly at the age of 
23, the accused is old enough to be aware that his offences were unlawful,”270 
or noting that in Kayishema & Ruzindana, where Rizindana was thirty-two years 
old,271 the ICTR “gave a rediculously wide interpretation to the term youth.”272 
The same analyst, on the other hand, applauded a prison sentence of fifteen years 
(instead of five as requested by the Defence) in the case of Esad Landžo (an 
Accused in the Case who was nineteen years old at the relevant time) 
praiseworthy, since it “prevented the Accused from exploiting the excuse of age 
as a way of avoiding full accountability for his crime.”273 This line of reasoning 
is misleading, since the age of an accused was but one of several sentencing 
 
 265 Plavšić, supra note 253, at ¶ 108. 
 266 Prosecutor v. Jelisić, IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 124 (Dec. 14, 1999); see also Furundžiya, supra note 
262, at ¶ 284 (saying the same in regard to absence of previous convictions and the family disposition of the 
convicted person); Obrenović, supra note 235, at ¶ 140 (noting that in view of the gravity of the crime, the family 
circumstances of the accused cannot be afforded any significant eight); Momir Nikolić, supra note 235, at ¶ 169–
170 (deciding that family circumstances, such as the accused being a teacher, was married and had two sons can 
be said of many accused persons and should not be given any significant weight); Gatete, supra note 235, at 
¶ 681 (proclaiming that, given the gravity of the crimes committed, the Trial Chamber can only accord “very 
limited weight” to the lengthy public service, family situation and health condition of the accused). 
 267 Jelisić, supra note 6, ¶¶ 129, 131; see also Erdemović, supra note 243, ¶ 16; Furundžiya, supra note 
262, ¶ 284; Blaškić, supra note 242, ¶ 778; Kunarać, supra note 235, ¶ 864; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, 
supra note 54, ¶ 853; Banović, supra note 235, ¶ 75; Dragan Nikolić, supra note 235, ¶ 146; Deronjić, supra 
note 235, ¶ 124. 
 268 Jelisić, supra note 6, ¶ 131. 
 269 Supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 270 Olaoluwa Olusanya, Granting Immunity to Child Combatants Supranationally, in SENTENCING AND 
SANCTIONING IN SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 87, 106 (Roelof Haveman & Olaoluwa Olusanya eds., 2006). 
 271 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 12 (May 21, 1999). 
 272 Olusanya, supra note 271, at 107. 
 273 Id. at 105. 
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factors taken into account by the sentencing tribunals. In cases where the 
Accused was young but not so young (say in his thirties), age was considered 
for sentencing purposes, not as a mitigating circumstance in itself, but with a 
view to the chances of rehabilitation of the convicted person.274 In Prosecutor v. 
Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal declined to accept the age of twenty-seven years 
as a mitigating factor since the accused was “well beyond the age of majority.”275 
In Prosecutor v. Plavišić, the question whether being a senior (seventy-two years 
old) should serve as a mitigating factor was considered. The Tribunal stated that 
there was no authority in ICTY jurisprudence as to the effect of an advanced age 
on sentencing,276 but decided that an advanced age is a sentencing factor for two 
reasons: (a) physical deterioration that comes with age; and (b) the fact that the 
convicted person may have little worth-while time left to live for upon her 
release.277 The advanced age of the convicted person was therefore accepted by 
the Sentencing Tribunal as a mitigating factor.278 Sensitivity of the ad hoc 
Tribunals to age for sentencing purposes must indeed be applauded, since tender 
age and being not so young are in themselves mitigating factors. 
Other personal circumstances that have featured in judgments of the ad hoc 
Tribunals’ sentencing directives are a poor family background,279 physical and 
mental condition,280 poor health,281 indigence,282 a mediocre level of 
education,283 an immature and fragile personality,284 a corrigible personality 
favorable to rehabilitation,285 not being a danger to society,286 the work record 
 
 274 See Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 25, at ¶ 12 (noting that for sentencing purposes it considered 
“the relatively young age of Ruzindana (thirty-two years old in 1994) and the possibility of rehabilitation”); 
Blaškić, supra note 235, ¶ 778 (noting that “[t]he case-law of the two ad hoc Tribunals on rehabilitation takes 
the young age of the accused into account as a mitigating circumstance”).  
 275 Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 91. 
 276 Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 103; Krnojelać, supra note 235, ¶ 533. In Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, the 
Sentencing Tribunal did mention the accused’s age as a “final matter to which the Trial Chamber has had regard 
in sentencing.” 
 277 Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 105. 
 278 Id. at ¶ 106. 
 279 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1283; see also Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, 
¶ 16(i); Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 36; Serushago, supra note 208, ¶ 24; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91 
(simply mentioning the family position of the convicted person).  
 280 Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 11, ¶ 44; see also Todorović (Sentencing Judgment), 
supra note 10, ¶ 93–95 (dealing with the diminished mental capacity of the convicted person). 
 281 Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 50, 472; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 92, 94; Rutaganira, supra note 13, 
¶ 133, 135-36. 
 282 Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 62. 
 283 Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 61. 
 284 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1283; see also Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, 
¶ 16(i) under family background; Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 125 (mentioning personality disorders). 
 285 Erdemović (, supra note 11, ¶ 111.  
 286 Id. 
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of the convicted person,287 being non-nationalistic (that is, to one’s credit, not 
entertaining sectional biases in a highly polarized plural society),288 and finally, 
having to serve a prison sentence far from home.289 
Emphasis has also been placed, in extenuation, on the general nicety of a 
convicted person, for example: being “an honest and respectable citizen;”290 or 
being inspired by a sense of justice; being an idealist, being immature and 
impulsive, having worked in the local branch of the Red Cross; assisting 
foreigners, the underprivileged and illiterate persons in the region; and rendering 
assistance to young students.291 Having “an honest character” and being “an 
easygoing young man showing no signs of bigotry or intolerance, with a desire 
to help others in difficulty,” was also considered in mitigation of sentence.292 
While a good character was mentioned as an extenuating circumstance in several 
judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals,293 in most cases little weight was given to 
the character of a convicted person for purposes of sentencing.294  
2. Prior Convictions 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence mention, as an aggravating 
circumstance, “[a]ny relevant prior criminal convictions for crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Court or of a similar nature.”295 Although not mentioned in 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it stands to reason that the absence of any 
prior convictions for such crimes should be taken into account in mitigation of 
the sentence. That, in any event, appears from several judgments of the ad hoc 
Tribunals.296 
 
 287 Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 63. 
 288 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 105–08; see also Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 280. 
 289 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 111.  
 290 Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 59; see also Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91. 
 291 Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 61–62. 
 292 Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(i) (under Character). As to the 
commendable character of a convicted person as a mitigating factor, see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 478; 
Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 164. 
 293 Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 236; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 779–82; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 459; 
Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 519; Ntakirutimana, supra note 90, ¶ 895, 906; Momir Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 164; 
Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 134; Semanza, supra note 147, ¶ 397; Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor, Case 
No ICTR-2001-64-A, ¶ 195 (July 7, 2006). 
 294 Kunarać, supra note 153, ¶ 33; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 782; Ntakirutimana, supra note 90, ¶ 908; 
Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 926; Niyitegeka, supra note 129, ¶ 264–66: Semanza, supra note 147, ¶ 398; Seromba, 
supra note 186, ¶ 235. 
 295 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(b)(i). 
 296 Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 63; Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra 
note 25, ¶ 16(i), under the heading, Character; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 45; Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 280, 
284; Aleksovski, supra note 11, ¶ 236; Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 124; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 780; Banović, 
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In Prosecutor v. Kordić, the Trial Chamber noted, on the other hand, that “it 
will be rare” for personal circumstances, such as character, no previous 
convictions, poor health, and youth, to play “a significant part” in mitigation of 
a sentence.297 In Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, the Trial Chamber decided that the 
fact that the accused had no previous convictions and was the father of a young 
child “[could not] be given significant weight in a case of [that] gravity.”298 
B. Conduct of the Convicted Person after the Event 
As far as the convicted person’s conduct after the criminal act is concerned, 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence mention two examples, namely “efforts by 
the person to compensate the victims” and “any co-operation with the Court.”299 
Judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals more generously laid special stress on co-
operation by the accused with the Prosecutor, a guilty plea, regret and remorse. 
1. Co-operation with the Court 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC mention, as a mitigating 
circumstance, “co-operation with the Court,”300 while the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of the ICTY and of the ICTR expressly provide that “substantial 
co-operation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person” is to be taken into 
account as an mitigating circumstance.301 Co-operation with the Prosecutor 
must, thus in terms of the latter set of Rules, be “substantial.”302 Substantiality 
of co-operation will depend in part on “the extent and quality of the information 
provided to the Prosecution.”303 In Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, a Trial 
 
supra note 6, ¶¶ 62, 76; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 59; Rutaganira, supra note 13, 
¶ 130; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91. 
 297 Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 848. 
 298 Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 284; see also Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 76. 
 299 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(a)(ii). 
 300 Id. 
 301 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal, Rule 101(B)(ii), U.N. Doc. 
IT/32/Rev.13, reprinted in International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 
Basic Documents 29, at 130 (1998) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 101(B)(ii), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.2 (July 5, 1996), reprinted in Virginia 
Morris & Michael Scharf, 2 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 19, at 55 (1999) [hereafter ICTR 
RPE]; see also Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 180 (emphasizing that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
ad hoc Tribunals only mention co-operation with the Prosecutor and do not cover other forms of co-operation). 
 302 Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 179. 
 303 Todorović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 10, ¶ 86; see also Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶ 111; Plavšić, 
supra note 61, ¶ 63; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 58; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 62; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 244. 
VAN DER VYVERPROOFS_6.5.19 6/5/2019 10:52 AM 
2019] INTERNATIONAL DIRECTIVES 577 
Chamber of the ICTY found that cooperation with the Prosecutor was only 
“modest” but did deserve some, albeit very little, weight.304 
In several of their judgments, the ICTY305 and the ICTR306 looked favorably 
upon substantial co-operation with the Prosecutor. Voluntary surrender was 
specially mentioned, to the convicted person’s credit, in Prosecutor v. 
Serushago.307 In Prosecutor v. Obrenović, the Sentencing Tribunal attached 
“little weight” to an offer by the Accused to surrender when he was arrested, 
because it was not clear whether he would have surrendered voluntary if his 
arrest was not imminent.308  
In Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the Trial Chamber laid down the conditions under 
which co-operation with the Prosecutor will qualify as mitigating factors: 
The earnestness and degree of co-operation with the Prosecutor 
decides whether there is reason to reduce the sentence on this ground. 
Therefore, the evaluation of the accused’s co-operation depends on the 
information he provides. Moreover, the Trial Chamber singles out for 
mention the spontaneity and selflessness of the co-operation which 
must be lent without asking for something in return. Provided that the 
co-operation lent respects the aforesaid requirements, the Trial 
Chamber classes such co-operation as a “significant mitigating 
factor[.]”309  
In Prosecutor v. Deronjević, the Sentencing Tribunal decided, on basis of a 
guilty plea and substantial co-operation, that “a substantial reduction of the 
sentence deserved for the crime is warranted.”310 
Expecting nothing in return would mean that a plea agreement cannot be 
accepted as co-operation.311 In the Čelebići Case, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY 
 
 304 Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶ 299; endorsed on appeal in Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 180.  
 305 Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 11, ¶¶ 99–101; Erdemović (Second Sentencing 
Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(i), under the heading, Character, ¶ iv, 21; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment), 
supra note 10, ¶¶ 83–88; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 109; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 122, 129, 141; Deronjić, 
supra note 9, ¶ 156; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91. 
 306 Kayishema, supra note 25, at Sentence ¶ 20; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 29, 36, 47, 61(i); Serushago, 
supra note 33, ¶¶ 31–33, 38, 41; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶¶ 56‒58; Musema, supra note 107, ¶ 1007; Serushago, 
supra note 208, ¶ 24. 
 307 Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 34, 41; see also Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 55; Kayishema, supra note 
25, ¶ 20; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 853, 860, 863; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 776; Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 868; 
Serushago, supra note 208, ¶ 24; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 430; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 65, 84, 110; 
Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 136, 141; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 156, 266; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 145. 
 308 Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 111; see also Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 267. 
 309 Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 774. 
 310 Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 276. 
 311 Contra Schabas, supra note 73, at 497 (stating that if an admission of guilt is to be a mitigating factor, 
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altogether rules out an attempt at plea bargaining as a mitigating factor.312 In the 
case of Duško Tadić, the Trial Chamber found that although there was “some 
degree of co-operation” by the accused with the Prosecutor, it did not live up to 
the standard of “substantial co-operation” and should therefore not be taken into 
account for sentencing purposes.313 Although substantial co-operation with the 
prosecutor serves as a mitigating factor, failure of an accused to co-operate is 
not necessarily an aggravating factor,314 because an accused has the right to be 
presumed innocent and can reap the benefit of the fact that the burden of proof 
rest squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution. 
2. Admission of Guilt 
An admission of guilt is not expressly mentioned in the ICC’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence as a mitigating factor, probably because of differences 
of opinion between proponents of the adversarial and the inquisitorial 
procedures as to the significance of such a plea.315 It could, of course, come 
within the general confines of co-operation with the Court,316 but has been 
mentioned in judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals as an extenuating circumstance 
alongside co-operation with the Court.317 
In Erdemović, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY had this to say about an 
admission of guilt:  
An admission of guilt demonstrates honesty and it is important for the 
International Tribunal to encourage people to come forth, whether 
already indicted or as unknown perpetrators. Furthermore, this 
voluntary admission of guilt which has saved the International 
 
it would encourage plea bargaining). 
 312 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1280. 
 313 Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 8, ¶ 19; see also Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 
96, ¶ 58 (noting that the convicted person did not co-operate and denied his guilt). 
 314 Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 64; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 61; Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR-
00-60-T, Judge and Sentence ¶ 127 (Apr. 13, 2006); Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 680. 
 315 France and Rwanda were among those who believed that an admission of guilt should not be taken into 
account for sentencing purposes. See Schabas, supra note 25, at 1526 note 193. 
 316 See Peglau, supra note 2, at 148. 
 317 Serushago, supra note 208, ¶ 24; see also Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 11, ¶ 55; 
Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(ii); Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶¶ 36, 50, 52, 
61(iii); Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 35, 41; Kayishema, supra note 25, at Sentence ¶ 20; Ruggiu, supra note 
28, ¶ 53–55; Jelisić (A), supra note 80, ¶ 122; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 10, ¶ 76; Sikirica, 
supra note 80, ¶¶ 148–51, 192–93, 228; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 464; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 65, 66–81, 
110; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 62, 68; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 111–18, 141; Nikolić, supra note 35, ¶¶ 146, 
232–37; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 60; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶¶ 89, 91. 
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Tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy investigation and trial is to be 
commended.318 
In Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, the Sentencing Tribunal cautioned against 
affording “undue consideration or importance to the role of a guilty plea to 
saving of resources.”319 The Tribunal referred to a strongly worded dissenting 
opinion of Judge David Hunt, in the case against Slobodan Milošević, relating 
to the admissibility of evidence in the form of written statements, which was 
seemingly resorted to by the ICTY to comply with the Completion Strategy 
imposed upon the ad hoc Tribunals by the Security Council.320 According to 
Judge Hunt, the ICTY “will not be judged by the number of convictions which 
it enters, or by the speed with which it concludes the Completion Strategy which 
the Security Council has endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials.”321 In Momir 
Nikolic, the Sentencing Tribunal stated along much the same lines that “savings 
of time and resources may be a result of guilty pleas,” but “should not be the 
main reason for promoting guilty pleas through plea agreements.”322 An 
appropriate sentence must primarily be based on the gravity of the offence and 
not on a guilty plea.323 
In Todorović, the Trial Chamber added to the benefits of an admission of 
guilt mentioned in Erdemović the fact that it “relieves victims and witnesses of 
the necessity of giving evidence with the attendant stress which this may 
incur,”324 but also noted that to derive all the benefits concerned that would 
prompt a lighter sentence, the admission of guilt must be entered before 
commencement of the trial and in any event not at a late stage of the 
 
 318 Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(i) (under Character); see also 
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 
¶ 2; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 10, ¶ 80; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 73; Banović, supra note 6, 
¶¶ 66, 68; Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 151; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 118; Dragan Nikolić, supra note 35, ¶¶ 121, 
231; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 234 see also id., ¶ 134 (the Sentencing Tribunal noting that “[a]s a side effect, 
albeit not a significant mitigating factor, it [a guilty plea] also saves the Tribunal’s resources”); Češić, supra 
note 9, ¶ 56, 59. 
 319 Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 67. 
 320 See S.C. Res. 1503 (2003) of Aug. 28, 2003, calling on the ad hoc Tribunals to take all possible 
measures to complete all trial activities at front instance by the end of 2008. 
 321 Prosecutior v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David 
Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the Form of Written Statements, ¶ 22 (Oct. 21, 2003); see also 
Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-A15bis, ¶ 17 (Sep. 24, 2003). 
 322 Momir Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 67. 
 323  Id., ¶ 69. 
 324 Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 80. See also id., ¶ 92 (accepting remorse, a guilty plea and co-operation 
with the Prosecutor as mitigating factors); Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 66; Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 150; Obrenović, 
supra note 9, ¶ 117; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 121, 231; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 134 (noting that “[a] guilty 
plea protects victims from having to relive their experiences and re-open old wounds”); Češić, supra note 9, 
¶¶ 56, 58. 
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proceedings.325 The importance of the timing of a guilty plea was also 
emphasized in Prosecutor v. Sikirica.326 In Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, the 
Sentencing Tribunal afforded “some credit” to a guilty plea despite its 
lateness.327 In the Delalić Case, the Trial Chamber refused to accept a “belated 
partial admission of guilt” as a mitigating factor.328 In the Case of Duško Tadić, 
the Trial Chamber took a grim view of the fact that the accused falsely asserted 
an alibi and denied his guilt.329 
In Kambanda, the Trial Chamber reiterated that an admission of guilt 
demonstrates honesty,330 and added that a guilty plea “is likely to encourage 
other individuals to recognize their responsibilities during the tragic events 
which occurred in Rwanda in 1994.”331 The Tribunal did note that a guilty plea 
does not necessarily mean remorse.332 Other deserving attributes of a guilty plea 
are its contribution to establishing the truth,333 its potential of promoting 
reconciliation within a strife-torn community,334 and its being an important step 
toward rehabilitation of the accused and his or her re-integration in society.335  
It is one thing to say that an admission of guilt should count as a mitigating 
factor; it is quite another to hold a plea of not guilty as an aggravating factor. 
There is also a difference between persistently denying one’s guilt and entering 
a plea of not guilty. Pleading not guilty and leaving it up to the Prosecutor to 
prove one’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a recognized right of every person 
confronting criminal charges, and that right is founded on the presumption of 
innocence which in turn is a salient principle of criminal justice.336 Aggravation 
 
 325 Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 81. See also Momir Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 148; Češić, supra note 9, 
¶ 56; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 151–52. 
 326 Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶ 150. See also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 231; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 234.  
 327 Simić, supra note 153, ¶ 87. See also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 231.  
 328 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1279. See also Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 777 (noting that an admission of guilt 
is an extenuating factor but that it did not apply in that case because the accused did not plead guilty). 
 329 Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 58; Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 25, at Sentence 
¶ 16. 
 330 Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 53. See also Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgement), supra note 25, 
¶ 16(ii); Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 66. 
 331 Kambanda, supra note 9 ¶ 61(ii). See also Erdemović(Second Sentencing Judgement), supra note 25, 
¶ 16(ii); Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 231; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 234. 
 332 Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 52. 
 333 Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶ 149; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 73, 80; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 66; Nikolić, 
supra note 80, ¶149; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 116; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 231, 233, 237; Češić, supra note 
9, ¶¶ 28, 58; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 234, 236. 
 334 Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 70, 79, 80; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 66; Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶¶ 72, 145, 
149; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 111, 116; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 121, 231; Češić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 28, 58; 
Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 234, 236. 
 335 Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 28. 
 336 Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶148; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 113. 
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of sentence should not merely be based on a plea of not guilty. However, an 
accused who gives false evidence and by word and conduct dishonestly persist 
in his or her innocence exceeds the accepted confines of the presumption of 
innocence, and that conduct can and should be taken into account for sentencing 
purposes.  
3. Regret and Remorse 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC refer in quite general terms 
to conduct of the convicted person after the criminal act, adding only one 
example indicative of regret and remorse: “efforts by the person to compensate 
victims.”337 
Co-operation with the prosecution, a guilty plea, and evidence of remorse as 
grounds of extenuation338 have had a mixed reception in the ad hoc Tribunals. 
Regret and remorse, or regret and repentance, was accepted in Ruggiu as a 
mitigating factor,339 and having been expressed in public was favorably looked 
upon by the sentencing Tribunal in Prosecutor v. Serushago.340 In Prosecutor v. 
Obrenović, the Sentencing Tribunal accepted genuine remorse as “a substantial 
mitigating factor.”341 In Prosecutor v. Plavšić, the expression of remorse 
connected with a guilty plea was considered a mitigating factor.342 In Prosecutor 
v. Kupreskić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY decided that “limited 
acceptance of guilt” ought to be given “some consideration in terms of 
sentence.”343 However, remorse was treated in Kambanda with a great deal of 
skepticism.344 The Trial Chamber noted in that case that “remorse is not the only 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from a guilty plea.”345 It must above all 
 
 337 RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(a)(ii). 
 338 See generally Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 25, ¶ 20; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶¶ 53–55; 
Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 92. 
 339 Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶¶ 56–58, 69–72. See also Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 44, 45; Erdemović 
(Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(iii) (under the heading, Remorse); Kambanda, supra note 9, 
¶ 34, 52; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 40–41; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 775; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 1277; 
Serushago v. Prosecutor, supra note 208, ¶ 24; Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 89-92; Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶ 148; 
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 65, 70; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 62; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 121, 141; Nikolić, 
supra note 34, ¶¶ 231, 237, 241–42; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 156, 234; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91. 
 340 Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 40. 
 341 Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 121. 
 342 Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 73. 
 343 Kupreškić, supra note 293, ¶ 464. See also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 146; Prosecutor v. Deronjić, supra 
note 9, ¶ 156.  
 344 Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶¶ 51–52. 
 345 Id., ¶ 52; see id., ¶ 61. See also Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 127 (the Tribunal only affording “relative 
weight” to the accused’s admission of guilt, because he did not show any remorse before the guilty plea), aff’d 
by Jelisić, supra note 80 (A), ¶¶ 119-23; Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 161 (the Sentencing Tribunal accepting the 
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be demonstrated that the expression of remorse is sincere.346 It is possible, of 
course, that an accused can express sincere regrets without admitting his or her 
participation in the crime.347 
In the Čelebići Case, the accused after his conviction submitted to the 
Tribunal a written statement expressing his regrets. The tribunal would have 
nothing of it, stating that “[s]uch expression of remorse would have been more 
appropriately made in open court, with these victims and witnesses present, and 
thus this ostensible, belated contrition seems to merely have been an attempt to 
seek concession in the matter of sentencing.”348 
Participating in acts of mercy and assistance to victims will almost invariably 
be perceived by a sentencing Tribunal as concrete evidence of regret and 
remorse, or perhaps of reluctant participation under pressure in the criminal act 
and will either way serve in mitigation of sentence.349 
A persistent defiant attitude will, on the other hand, demonstrate absence of 
regret and remorse and will do the accused no good when upon conviction the 
sentence to be imposed becomes an issue. In the Čelebići Case, for example, the 
Trial Chamber noted: “[t]he accused has consistently demonstrated a defiant 
attitude and a lack of respect for the judicial process and for the participants in 
the trial, almost verging on lack of awareness of the gravity of the offences for 
which he is charged and the solemnity of the judicial process.”350  
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
This is not the time and place to record and to evaluate the American 
sentencing practices. However, there are some lessons in the above analysis for 
 
expression of remorse as a mitigating factor but in view of the circumstances of the case declining to afford 
“substantial weight to this factor.”). 
 346 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 96–98; Erdemović, supra note 25, ¶ 16; Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 127; 
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 775; Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 89; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 41; Ruggiu, supra 
note 28, ¶¶ 69–72; Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶¶ 152, 194, 230; Simić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 153, ¶ 92; 
Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 72; Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 177; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 66; Deronjić, supra note 9, 
¶ 156; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 158. 
 347 Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 177. 
 348 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1279. 
 349 Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 111; Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgement), supra note 25, ¶ 16(iii), 
17; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶¶ 34, 50–52; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1270; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 38, 40; 
Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 25, ¶ 20; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 471; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶¶ 73–
74; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 775-76; Serushago v. Prosecutor, supra note 208, ¶ 24; Sikirica, supra note 80, 
¶ 242; Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 518; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 83; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 134; Nikolić, 
supra note 34, ¶ 146; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 78; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 155. 
 350 Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1244. See also id., ¶¶ 1217, 1251. 
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American penologists. It is worth noting, in conclusion, that the sentencing 
practices of the United States are not even remotely in conformity with what has 
come to be accepted as international directives of sentencing standards. 
In the United States, almost exclusive emphasis is placed, for sentencing 
purposes, on the gravity of the crime.351 In Solem v. Helms, it was decided that 
proportionality of a punishment to the offence is determined with three criteria 
in mind: “(i) the gravity of the offence and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the 
sentences imposed on other criminals [for offences of the same gravity] in the 
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”352 The essence of the penal policy in Solem was subsequently 
overruled in Harmelin v. Michigan, where Justice Scalia decided that “the 
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee”;353 that taking into 
account mitigating factors for sentencing purposes “has no support in the text 
and history of the Eighth Amendment”;354 and that “[s]evere, mandatory 
penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, 
having been employed in various forms throughout our Nation’s history.”355 
Individualization of sentencing to fit the crime, the criminal, and the interests of 
society, which have become the international standard of penology, is thus not 
part of the American sentencing philosophy. Prosecuting juveniles as adults and 
imposing penalties in such cases without regard to their reduced culpability, 
maintaining the death penalty and imposing prison sentences without the option 
of parole, and applying the sentencing guidelines as though they were mandatory 
simply deviates from taking into account for sentencing purposes the personal 
circumstances and culpability of a convicted person. 
A few isolated, yet important, recent innovations by the U.S. Supreme Court 
must be applauded as initiatives that brought the United States closer to 
upholding generally accepted standards in its criminal justice system. 
Proclaiming juvenile executions,356 and life imprisonment of juveniles without 
the option of parole as a mandatory sentence,357 to be in violation of the “cruel 
and unusual” criteria of the Eighth Amendment was a step in the right direction, 
even though one must admit that the Court had to make a quantum leap to bypass 
 
 351 See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (holding that “it is a precept of justice that 
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offence.”). 
 352 Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). 
 353 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991). 
 354 Id., at 994. 
 355 Id., at 994–95. 
 356 Roper v. Simmons, 354 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 357 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
VAN DER VYVERPROOFS_6.5.19 6/5/2019 10:52 AM 
584 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
the “unusual” prong of the Eighth Amendment to reach its admirable conclusion 
in the life sentence without parole decision. No less than twenty-nine 
jurisdictions mandated life sentences without the option of parole for juvenile 
offenders, but noting differences that obtain in those jurisdictions, relating for 
example to minimum age requirements, whether the transfer of juvenile 
offenders to an adult court occurs automatically in the case of some offences or 
is left in the discretion of prosecutors, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to find 
that the laws applied by state courts meet the criterion of “usual” punishments.358 
In coming to this conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court used language that is 
in conformity with international standards of juvenile justice, referring for 
example to the “lesser culpability” and “greater capacity for change” of juvenile 
offenders,359 and the requirement of “individualised sentencing”360 It 
emphasized that a basic precept of justice requires “that punishment for crime 
should be graduated and proportioned,” and that individuals consequently have 
“the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”361 The U.S. Supreme Court 
proclaimed quite admirably that juveniles have “lessened culpability” and 
therefore “are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”362 The “gaps 
between juveniles and adults” are threefold: “(a) lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility;” (b) vulnerability or susceptibility “to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”, and (c) the 
fact that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”363  
Such rhetoric is indeed admirable but will remain a voice calling in the dark 
as long as juveniles can be prosecuted and sentenced as though they were adults; 
or in general, as long as the United States declines to impose the basic norm of 
criminology that punishments must not only be determined by the gravity of the 
crime, the manner in which it was executed, its harmful consequences, and the 
means of perpetration by the convicted person, but should also take note of and 
accommodate the personal circumstances of the individual to be sentenced, such 
as his or her degree of intent, diminished mental capacity, or individual 
circumstances, such as age, background, education, intelligence, and mental 
structure. 
 
 358 Id., at 483–89. 
 359 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69, 74 (2010); Alabama, 567 U.S. at 465. 
 360 Alabama, 567 U.S. at 465. 
 361 Simmons, 354 U.S. at 560; Alabama, 567 U.S. at 469. 
 362 Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Alabama, 567 U.S. at 471. 
 363 Simmons, 354 U.S. at 569–70. See also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Alabama, 567 U.S. at 471. 
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It is to be hoped that the American sentencing system will in the not too 
distant future do justice to the concept of “justice” within the true meaning of 
the concept of criminal justice! 
 
